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TRESPASS TO LAND IN NORTH CAROLINA
PART II. REMEDIES FOR TRESPASSt
DAN B. DOBBS*

Having discussed the substantive law of trespass to land in the preceding issue of this volume, the author now turns to an examination
of the remedies available in an action for trespass in North Carolina.
A reading of the articlesuggests that the availability of both legal and
equitable remedies affords the North Carolina judge considerable
latitude in fashioning relief to fit the particular facts of each case.
The author covers the legal remedy of money damages, including statutory and restitutionary measures of damages, and the equitable remedy of injunction.
INTRODUCTION

Part I of this article considered the substantive law of trespass to
land in North Carolina.** When substantive law determines that a
trespass has been committed, there remains the problem of selecting an
appropriate remedy. A money recovery as "damages," is, of course, the
most common remedy. Less common, but important, is the money recovery based upon a restitutionary measure, the kind of thing involved
in "waiving the tort and suing in assumpsit." Equitable relief against
trespass is perhaps more and more common, and it constitutes an important segment of the remedies law of trespass today. This part considers
each of these remedies for trespass to land and the subsidiary issues raised
when these remedies are sought.
DAMAGES

Possessory Interests-Nominal and ParasiticDamages
Anyone who is entitled to recover under the substantive rules of trespass is always entitled to recover at least nominal damages.' This is in
t Copyright 1969 by Dan B. Dobbs. All rights reserved.
* Professor of Law, University of North Carolina; Visiting Professor, Cornell
Law School, 1968-69.
** Dobbs, Trespass to Land in North Carolina-PartL The Substantive Law,
47 N.C.L. REv. 31 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Dobbs, Part I].
'Keziah v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 272 N.C. 299, 158 S.E.2d 539 (1968)
(parked truck on land); Schafer v. Southern Ry., 266 N.C. 285, 145 S.E.2d 887,
mnodified in other respects, 267 N.C. 419, 148 S.E.2d 292 (1966); Lee v. Lee, 180
N.C. 86, 104 S.E. 67 (1920) ; Hutton & Bourbonnais, Inc. v. Cook, 173 N.C. 496, 92
S.E. 355 (1917); Harris v. Sneeden, 104 N.C. 369, 10 S.E. 477 (1889); Dougherty
v. Stepp, 18 N.C. 371 (1835).
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part a historical hangover and in part a modem recognition that even
an entry that does not cause physical harm to the land is, absent a
privilege, nevertheless an invasion of the sanctuary the occupant ought
to have, and that such entries ought to be discouraged by assessment of
damages.2
Damages in this situation-where there is no physical harm to the
land or its structures-are recoverable by the possessor, not the owner,
if the ownership and possession are in different persons, since it is "possession" or dignitary rights that have been injured, not "ownership" or
3

economic rights.

Damages are not limited here to purely nominal damages. If the
invasion is substantial, juries are allowed to award what might be called
"general" damages, which, though subject to judicial control, are still
more than nominal sums of one dollar or the like.' In addition to these
damages, the plaintiff may recover any other loss he suffers as a direct
result of the trespass.5 Typical of this group of damages is the mental
anguish, or emotional distress, damage resulting from the trespass or
the way in which it was carried out." In addition, punitive damages
may be awarded if the trespass is carried out "maliciously '

7

or with

violence. The usual formula emphasizes "malice" as the basis for the
award of punitive damages, but any serious form of aggravated misconduct seems to be sufficient; certainly violence is,' and possibly extreme rudeness. 9 The subjective state of mind of the trespasser suggested
by talk of "malice" does not, in fact, seem to be what courts are considering.
Physical Damage-Timber, Minerals, and Structures
Where timber is cut, there are two alternative measures of damages
' Dobbs, Part I.

aId.
'See Duncan v. Stalcup, 18 N.C. 440 (1836).
See Dobbs, PartI 46-49.
'E.g., May v. Western Union Tel. Co., 157 N.C. 416, 72 S.E. 1059 (1911).

See 7Dobbs, Part I 46-49.

E.g., Wylie v. Smitherman, 30 N.C. 236 (1848).

'Duncan v. Stalcup, 18 N.C. 440 (1836). In this case, the defendant allegedly
shot plaintiff's dog and cattle, killed his horses and hogs, and burned his stables
and stacks. Punitive damages were allowed, since "it is scarcely possible that the

trespasses complained of could have been committed without wanton malice and
insult." Id. at 442.
' Remington v. Kirby, 120 N.C. 320, 26 S.E. 917 (1897), where the court spoke
of trespass committed "through malice, or accompanied by threats, oppression or
rudeness to the owner or occupant." Id. at 325, 26 S.E. at 917.
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available apart from statute.1 0 One gives the landowner the difference
in the value of his land immediately before and immediately after the
cutting; that is, it gives him the diminution in value of his land by reason
12
of the trespass. 1 The other gives him the value of the timber as timber.
It seems probable that in some cases damages will be higher when the
diminution in value of land is used as a measure, and that in other cases
damages will be higher when the timber value is used." Since the aim
is to fully compensate the plaintiff for any losses, it seems clear that he
should have an option and should recover on the basis of the highest
yield. Apparently, he does in fact have such an option in North Carolina
and may claim either -measure of damages.' 4 Historically this may have
been true because timber cutting might easily be regarded as a trespass
to land and the diminution.in value of land test used, or it might equally
be regarded as a conversion of personal property and the timber value
test used.' 5 Since the departure of the forms of action, however, it no
longer seems relevant to consider whether timber is personalty or realty
for purposes of assessing damages, and either measure of damages is
available to the plaintiff.'"
The measures of damages discussed above may be enhanced in two
ways. By statute a trespasser cutting "wood, timber, shrub or tree" is
liable to the landowner "for double the value" of the timber cut or removed.' The statute formerly imposed liability only when the timber
cutter was an intentional wrongdoer, 8 but the present version imposes
not only double, but strict, liability as well.' The statutory liability is
' See generally Annot., 161 A.L.R. 549 (1946); Annot., 69 A.L.R.2d 1335
(1960).
" Jenkins v. Montgomery Lumber Co., 154 N.C. 355, 70 S.E. 633 (1911); Wil-

liams v. Elm City Lumber Co., 154 N.C. 306, 70 S.E. 631 (1911); Brickell v.
Camp Mfg. Co., 147 N.C. 118, 60 S.E. 905 (1908); Waters v. Greenleaf-Johnson
Lumber Co., 115 N.C. 648, 20 S.E. 718 (1894). In Owens v. Blackwood Lumber
Co., 212 N.C. 133, 193 S.E. 219 (1947), the Court said that the measure of damages was the reduced market value of the land where there was not total destruction 2and the injury was "negligent." Id. at 139, 193 S.E. at 223.
Wall v. Holloman, 156 N.C. 275, 72 S.E. 369 (1911); Bennett v. Thompson,
35 N.C.
146 (1851).
"8See Williams v. Elm City Lumber Co., 154 N.C. 306, 70 S.E. 631 (1911).

"'See cases cited notes 11 & 12 supra.

v. Elm City Lumber Co., 154 N.C. 306, 70 S.F. 631 (1911).
For some purposes it remains important to classify property as "real" or "personal," and there are rules for classifying timber. N.C. GEN. STAT. §25-2-107
(1965). But the classification appears to be immaterial for purposes of damages in
trespass
cases.
'7 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-539.1 (Supp. 1965).
• Caldwell Land & Lumber Co. v. Hayes, 157 N.C. 333, 72 S.E. 1078 (1911).
A Survey of Statutory Changes in North Carolina in 1955, 33 N.C.L.
Rnv. 513, 533 (1955).
'Williams
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"for double the value of such wood, timber, shrubs or trees," and this
presumably authorizes a doubling of the timber value, but not a doubling
of the loss in value of the land. In other words, the plaintiff apparently
has an option to seek either the statutory damages of double the timber
value, or the diminution in value of the land, not doubled. The latter
might be preferable to the landowner, for example, if the timber cut had
little or no commercial value, but its removal reduced the value of the
lot considerably.
Damages may also be enhanced if the trespasser is a knowing wrongdoer, for in such a case the North Carolina Supreme Court would apparently follow the rule that the landowner may recover not only the
value of the timber at the stump, but any value added to it by the trespasser's labors."0 For example, if defendant, a willful wrongdoer, cuts
plaintiff's timber, it may be worth 100 dollars at the stump. But the defendant may transport it ten miles downstream to a mill where it will
bring 300 dollars. Defendant's labor and expense of transport have increased the value of the timber. In this situation, the intentional trespasser is apparently held liable for the entire value of the timber.
The double damages statute is ambigious in respect of timber removed and enhanced in value by the defendant's labors. Damage to be
21
recovered is "double the value of such wood . . . cut or removed.
But this might mean "double the value where cut," or "double the value
any time up until sale by the trespasser." Thus, the plaintiff in the illustration above might recover 200 dollars under the statute (the 100
dollar value of the timber doubled). Or he might recover 600
dollars (the 300 dollar value of the timber after defendant had transported it, doubled). Still another possibility is that in this situation the
statute has no application at all and the plaintiff recovers 300 dollars,
the enhanced value of the timber. It must be emphasized again, that the
enhanced value is recovered only if the defendant is a willful wrongdoer.
Minerals have been of less economic importance in North Carolina
(1911), adopting the
20 See Wall v. Holloman, 156 N.C. 275, 72 S.E. 369
rule that "in absence of willful wrongdoing compensatory damages are intended
as a pecuniary equivalent for the property lost by defendant's wrong, and where
property is lost, converted, or destroyed, the owner is compensated when he receives
its full value in money." Id. at 278, 72 S.E. at 370. In that case the timber cut
was worth 24 dollars where it was cut, but 84 dollars at the place to which the
trespasser had transported it. The plaintiff was allowed to recover only 24 dollars
under the rule quoted above, since the trespasser was not a willful wrongdoer. The
implication is that plaintiff could have recovered 84 dollars-the value of the
trespasser's labors-had the trespass been willful.
timber as enhanced by §the
"N.C. GEN. STAT. 1-539.1(a) (Supp. 1967).
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than timber, but the interest a landowner has in minerals is obviously
similar in some respects to his interest in timber. Though there is a
dearth of case law on the subject of minerals, there is a statute imposing
liability for double the value of minerals "mined or carried away" by a
trespasser.2 2
Damage to structures on the plaintiff's land is also sometimes compensated by giving the plaintiff the diminution in the market value of
his property resulting from the trespass. 23 Here again, however, the
objective is to afford full relief, and repair costs may in some instances
furnish an equally acceptable measure of damages and are certainly entirely relevant to test "the reasonableness of the opinion expressed by
the witnesses as to the market value .... "'
Replacement Cost-Restorable Trees and Structures, Removable Debris
Where a trespasser destroys or removes ornamental trees or shrubs,
or damages structures on the land such as fences or buildings, there are
at least two appropriate measures of damages. One measure is the diminution in land value caused by the trespass, that is, the difference between the value of the land as a whole immediately before and immediately after the trespass.5

This will often operate as an accurate reflection of losses. At other
times, however, this measure of damages will be inadequate. Removal of
an ancient oak may actually increase the value of the land for commercial
22 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 74-32 (1965). The wording of the statute is quite different
from the timber statute, note 17 supra, and it also provides a means of calculating
the value of minerals carried away by use of an "average assay."
" Paris v. Carolina Port. Aggregates, Inc., 271 N.C. 471, 157 S.E.2d 131 (1967)
(blasting in quarry operation allegedly caused vibrations and cracks in house).
"Broadhurst v. Blythe Bros., 220 N.C. 464, 469, 17 S.E.2d 646, 649 (1941).
"' This, of course, is the general rule where land itself is involved. E.g., Bickwell v. Camp Mfg. Co., 147 N.C. 118, 60 S.E. 905 (1908). Where a manufacturing
plant was damaged by shunting railroad cars, the reduced market value test was
applied in West Constr. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 185 N.C. 43, 116 S.E. 3
(1923). The Court said that "the rule generally adopted is to allow the plaintiff
the difference between the market value of the property immediately before the
injury occurred and the like value immediately after the injury is complete." Id.
at 46, 116 S.E. at 5. In Paris v. Carolina Port. Aggregates, Inc., 271 N.C. 471, 157
S.E.2d 131 (1967), the defendant allegedly caused cracks in plaintiff's house by
blasting in a quarry. The Court said "the correct rule for the measurement of damages is the difference between the market value of the property before and after
the injury." Id. at 484, 157 S.E.2d at 141. Unless the structure is one with a ready
separate market, presumably this language means the measurement includes the
whole property, both land and structure. Broadhurst v. Blythe Bros., 220 N.C.
464, 17 S.E.2d 646 (1941) (structure cracked and moved, diminution in market
value of "the property" is measure of recovery); cf. Wylie v. Smitherman, 30 N.C.
236 (1848) (county court house, perhaps an ambiguous opinion).
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purposes; but if the plaintiff wishes to use the land as his home, removal
of the tree takes away from him something he is entitled to have. Thus,
if he has a reason to replace destroyed trees or shrubs-as he normally
will where the land is a homesite-replacement cost is the appropriate
measure of damages, and several courts have so held, even where replacement cost exceeds the total value of the land. 6 Where the trees are timber trees and the landowner has no particular reason to replace them, replacement cost is not used as a measure of damage' and one of the normal
28
measures is used instead.

Replacement cost is also an appropriate measure whenever the trespass destroys structures that normally would be replaced or that the
landowner intends to replace, such as fences, for example.2 9 The same
is true where the trespass does not destroy structures but leaves obstructions on the land which normally would be removed." And a similar
rule is appropriate where repair rather than replacement is in order.31
It is perfectly appropriate to award replacement costs to landowners
in certain cases, but there should be some guarantee that the landowner in
fact does replace the property in its original condition. The landowner
may have two distinct interests in cases of this sort. One is financial:
he does not live on the land or use it personally, but merely wishes to
sell or rent it at a good price. The other interest, though compensable
in money, is not financial. It is the interest in using the land, enjoying
it, exercising dominion over it in any way, however idiosyncratic, short
" Elowsky v. Gulf Power Co., 172 So. 2d 643 (Fla. App. 1965). Here the court

allowed recovery for diminution in property value plus additional loss of shade
value to landowner and held that creature comforts "constitute property rights ...
separate and apart from the isolated value of the tree itself as part of the realty."
Id. at 645. See also Samson Constr. Co. v. Brusowankin, 218 Md. 458, 147 A.2d
430 (1958) (homesite was bulldozed "as bare as a board but not as smooth";
cost of replacement with trees as large as practical and as many as needed allowed;
replacement cost is appropriate though it exceeds value of lots) ; Huber v. Serpico,

71 N.J. Super. 329, 176 A.2d 805 (1962) (verdict of 6500 dollars sustained for
cutting of shade trees though total value of portion of lot cut was only 3000 dollars).

In McKinnon v. Benedict, 38 Wis. 607, 157 N.W.2d 665 (1968), defendant
trespassed upon plaintiff's land and bulldozed a small portion of it. Although no

substantial tree growth was on the land, the small hill removed by the bulldozing
had screened plaintiff's land. The Wisconsin court sustained an award of 750
dollars for planting trees even though none had existed there before, since the trees
would serve, as the hill had, to screen the remainder of the plaintiff's land.
See Nilsson v. Hiscox, 158 So. 2d 799 (Fla. App. 1963).
See cases cited notes 11 & 12 supra.

:' Waters v. Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co., 115 N.C. 648, 20 S.E. 718 (1894).
so Id.
" See Roberts v. Cole, 82 N.C. 292 (1880) ; cf. Broadhurst v. Blythe Bros., 220

N.C. 464, 17 S.E.2d 646 (1941).
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of creating a nuisance on it. Thus, if the landowner wishes to have a
tree on the land, this interest is protected only if the trespasser is forced
to pay the cost of restoring the tree he has removed. And the trespasser
should be required to restore the tree-by paying enough money to allow
restoration-even if there is no purely financial loss and the market value
of the land has not been depreciated by the removal of the tree.
Suppose, however, the landowner recovers the cost of replacing the
tree and then, instead of replacing it, sells the land. If the absence of
one tree did not affect the market price, the landowner has recovered a
windfall-he has recovered enough to allow him to personally enjoy the
use of the land by replacing trees, even though it now appears that his
motive was not in use and enjoyment at all, but in selling the land. And,
as a saleable property, the land has not been damaged. In such a situation,
the landowner recovers a windfall over and above the nominal damages
to which he otherwise would be entitled. To avoid this, replacement cost
should be allowed only if the plaintiff shows an intention to replace. Possibly a court might insist upon an even better guarantee. This might
be done, for example, by entering a conditional decree or by requiring
plaintiff to post a bond or by ordering defendant to pay damages into
court to await replacement by the plaintiff. Since all of these things are
normally associated more with equity courts than with law courts, such
guarantees of the plaintiff's good faith might be difficult to come by.
Yet, in systems where law and equity are merged, as in North Carolina,
some special form of judgment to protect against abuse by a plaintiff
seems appropriate.
Crops
There has been a certain amount of difficulty over the problem of
assessing damages for destruction or injury to growing crops. 3 2 In an
early case the North Carolina Supreme Court said, somewhat ambiguously, that the plaintiff was to recover the highest price the crops were
worth where the defendant trespasser destroyed them. 3 But it did not
indicate the period of time in which the price was to be the "highest."
Another case allowed recovery for such sum as would "cover the injury
done to the crop before the plaintiff knew of the irruption of the hogs
and had time to drive them out . . . ."' A somewhat similar instruction
to the effect that plaintiff should recover "the reasonable value of the
" See generally Annot., 175 A.L.R. 159 (1948).
"3Denby v. Hairston, 8 N.C. 315 (1821).
"'Roberts v. Cole, 82 N.C. 292, 295 (1880).
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crops destroyed" was approved in still another case.35 In Sanderlin v.
Shaw,3 the defendant flooded plaintiff's land, destroying or damaging
corn. The plaintiff put on evidence as to the value of corn on the market
at Norfolk and Elizabeth City, not the value of a growing crop but of
mature corn. This the Court held proper, since "it was impossible to
ascertain the extent of the damage ...

without an inquiry into the value

of that article in its matured condition."3" Apparently, the Court approved the use of this evidence, not as a measure of damages per se, but
as one piece of evidence helpful in ascertaining the loss plaintiff has susof crops includes
tained. Other evidence available to establish the value
38
reports.
and
research
market
and
evidence
opinion
Here as elsewhere it is helpful to remember that damages are designed
to compensate the plaintiff, and any measure of damages that tends to
do this may be an appropriate one. Thus, in some instances the cost of
replanting a crop might be a more appropriate measure than the market
value of the matured crop, and in other instances rental or market value
of the land might be appropriate. What is required is a careful assessment of the money needed to fully compensate the landowner for the
losses he in fact suffers, and it should be realized that no one measure
of damages will be appropriate in all cases.
Rental Value of Land
In some situations, rental value of the land during the period of
trespass is the accepted measure of damages, in addition, of course, to
any other distinct damage done. Obviously this is not a satisfactory
measure of damages where there is only an isolated trespass. On the
other hand, it may be a satisfactory measure where plaintiff is deprived
of the use of the land for any substantial time, even where defendant does
not get a corresponding benefit. "Where the trespass suspends or impairs the enjoyment of the premises, compensation may be given on the
basis of the rental value .

.

. .""

It is likewise appropriate to allow

rental value where defendant actually occupies or uses the land, of
course.40 Thus, where defendant constructed and used a railroad on
plaintiff's land, the plaintiff was allowed to recover the rental value of
"Dixon v. District Grand Lodge of Odd Fellows,
(1917).
51 N.C. 225 (1858).
07 Id. at 229.
" See Casey v.Phillips Pipeline Co., 199 Kan. 538,
"Gwaltney v. Scottish Car. Timber Co., 115 N.C.
(1894).
" See Hughes v. Oliver, 228 N.C. 680, 47 S.E.2d 6

174 N.C. 139, 93 S.E. 461

431 P.2d 518 (1967).
579, 584, 20 S.E. 465, 467
(1948).
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the land "actually occupied by defendant" and in addition the reduction
in rental value of the surrounding land.4 1 The rental value in some cases
may be estimated by determining the actual profits or rents defendant
obtains from the land,2 but the recovery is not limited to the value received by defendant,4 3 and defendant is liable "for the actual rental value
of the land, and not what the defendant actually gathered from the land." 44
The recovery of rental value as a measure of damages in trespass is
associated to some extent with the recovery of mesne profits. The recovery of mesne profits in turn is associated with the action of trespass
following a successful ejectment suit by the plaintiff.45 Ejectment was
the form of action to recover possession of land, and it would lie when the
person having the rights to possession was actually dispossessed. This
train of association might lead to the conclusion that rental value is a
proper measure of damages in trespass only when an ejectment-type situation is involved, that is, only when the owner is actually dispossessed.
If this view were followed, a repeated use of the land of the plaintiff
for a parking lot would not necessarily involve dispossession and would
not justify recovery of rental value.4 6 But the train of association of
rental value with mesne profits and of mesne profits with ejectment and
dispossession is misleading. Whatever the issue was before the codes,
the issue today is simply one of fair and reasonable damages. Thus, it
does not matter whether there is a single and "continuous" trespass or
whether there are many separate trespasses. All a court need decide is
whether rental value is a fair and reasonable measure of damage or is a
fair element in estimating damage in a particular case.4 7 This view
" Leigh v. Garysburg Mfg. Co., 132 N.C. 167, 43 S.E. 632 (1903).

"See Womack v. Carter, 160 N.C. 286, 75 S.E. 1102 (1912) (plaintiff could
recover actual rent received by trespasser on the theory that he waived the tort) ;
C. McCoRmicK, DAMAGES 482 (1935). See also pp. 368-79 infra (restitution and
other recoveries compared).
"See pp. 368-79 infra. (restitution).
"Credle v. Ayers, 126 N.C. 11, 16, 35 S.E. 128, 129 (1900). The remedy
sought for the trespass in this case, as in a number of cases, was an action of
ejectment with a claim for inesne profits.
" See Brothers v. Hurdle, 32 N.C. 490 (1849). Here the Court stated that
[t]he action of trespass quare clausent for the mesne profits is a continuation of the action of ejectment .... Originally, the plaintiff in ejectment
recovered actual damages. It was only for the sake of convenience, that
the Courts adopted the practice of trying the title only in the ejectment
with sixpence damages, and then ascertaining the actual damages in a
new action for the mesze profits and damages.
Id. at 495.
" Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 43 N.J. 508, 205 A.2d 744, aff'g 84 NJ.
Super. 313, 202 A.2d 175 (1964).
7Id.
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seems in accord with the decisions of the North Carolina Supreme Court.
The only requirement stated for recovery of rental value is that the trespass suspend or impair the enjoyment of the premises."'
Lost Profits
There are at least some cases in which profits lost as a result of a
trespass may be recovered. When entry upon land damages a structure,
the plaintiff may recover the difference between the market value of the
property immediately before and immediately after the injury.49 In addition, evidence that the damage required a going business to shut down
temporarily or to cut back an operation, is admissible to show the reduction in the market value of the property.50
In Johnson v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.,"' defendant negligently caused a fire to burn plaintiff's premises. This destroyed certain
manufactured crates and raw materials used in manufacturing crates.
Plaintiff had a contract to provide these manufactured goods at a fixed
profit, which he lost because the goods destroyed by the fire were irreplaceable. The Court held that the plaintiff could recover his loss of
profits if they were sufficiently established. However, the Court drew
the line at profits expected under contracts, holding that profits might
have been made apart from existing contracts would be speculative. An
earlier case in which a trespasser destroyed fixtures in a theatre reached
a similar result, allowing the plaintiff theatre owner to recover lost prof52
its, but only on engagements for which he had already contracted.
Theoretically, at least, there are two distinct problems about loss of profits. One problem is that no one can be certain how much loss the trespass actually caused, since profits to be made in the future are necessarily
uncertain. 8 The other problem is that even where loss of profits' is
proved with reasonable certainty, some losses are so remote that, as a
matter of policy, courts refuse to hold the defendant liable. Where the
defendant is a wrongdoer, however, doubts about both these problems
are appropriately resolved against the defendant and liability is extended
fairly liberally in comparison with breach of contract cases.5 4 It may
"See note 39 supra.
, 00West Constr. Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 185 N.C. 43, 116 S.E. 3 (1923).

1d.

140 N.C. 574, 53 S.E. 362 (1906).
Willie v. Branch, 94 N.C. 142 (1886); cf. Bowen v. King, 146 N.C. 385, 59
S.E. 1044 (1907); Sledge v. Reid, 73 N.C. 440 (1875).
" See C.B. Coles & Sons v. Standard Lumber Co., 150 N.C. 183, 63 S.E. 736
(1909) (breach of contract to remove lumber from plaintiff's land, slowing down
plaintiff's business, held, loss of profits too speculative).
" See Foard v. Atlantic & N.C.R.R., 53 N.C. 235 (1860).
51

52
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also be true that the more certain the proof of loss, the less the problem
of "remoteness."
PERMANENT DAMAGES-CONTINUING

AND PERMANENT TRESPASSES

Many trespasses are committed in a single event. A man walks onto
another's land and then walks off again; the trespass is over and completed. Other trespasses may continue more or less indefinitely. They
may be repeated, as where an intruder takes a short cut across the land
every day, or they may be continuous, as where an intruder dumps a
load of trash which remains on the land indefinitely. For the most part,
these two situations are treated alike. The landowner may sue for damages accruing up until the time of trial, 5 and if the offending deposit remains on his land or the intruder continues to use the land as a short
cut, he may sue again."' Theoretically, this may keep up indefinitely,
though the defendant may soon become tired of paying claims and remove
the trash or cease to use the land; or the plaintiff may stop the trespasses
by procuring an injunction 7 or perhaps by procuring an ejectment judgment. 58
There are other situations, however, where the courts do not allow
successive actions by the landowner. In these situations, often classified
as involving a nuisance, the landowner is allowed to bring only one suita suit for "permanent" damages that includes all future damages. This
is treated as a taking of an interest in the land and is measured by the
reduction in the value of the land resulting from the taking or trespass 5
"Webb v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 170 N.C. 662, 87 S.E. 633 (1916).

Here the Court stated: "[D]amages may be awarded to the time of trial if the
nuisance continues to that time." Id. at 666, 87 S.E. at 635. See also Dale v.

Southern Ry., 132 N.C. 705, 44 S.E. 399 (1903); Ridley v. Seaboard & R.R.R.,
118 N.C. 996, 24 S.E. 730 (1896).

"' Ridley v.Seaboard & R.R.R., 118 N.C.996, 24 S.E. 730 (1896). The Court
said that "[o]rdinarily where a trespass results in a nuisance, not only isthe
original wrong actionable, but successive suits may be brought for its continuance."
Id. at 997, 24 S.E. at 731. See also Anderson v.Town of Waynesville, 203 N.C.
37, 164 S.E. 583 (1932); Webb v.Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 170 N.C. 662,
87 S.E. 633 (1916).
See pp. 351-65 infra.
'Hill v. Development Co., 251 N.C. 52, 110 S.E.2d 321 (1959).
"'Beach v.Wilmington & W.R.R., 120 N.C. 498, 26 S.E. 703 (1897). The
Court stated:
The amount recovered isnot the estimated sum of all future damages
expected to result from a continuing trespass, for such damage, running
indefinitely, perhaps forever, would be utterly incapable of calculation; and,
moreover, itwould be giving the defendant a right to commit a wrong.
The sum recoverable isthe damage done to the estate of the plaintiff by the
appropriation to the easement of so much of his land.
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This stands in contrast with the damages recoverable in successive actions, which might include, instead of reduction in land value, such
actual losses as result from the trespass-crop damage, for dxample.6"
In general the recovery for permanent or prospective damages is
forced upon a plaintiff-and sometimes upon a defendant 6 1-- when two
conditions coincide: first the trespass or nuisance involves a physically
permanent structure, such as a railroad or a highway, and second, the
trespass is one legally permanent-that is, sanctioned in the public interest and not abatable by an injunction, usually because the defendant
has the power of eminent domain and could acquire the land for a fee in
any event. This is put in a leading North Carolina decision in this way:
[W]here the injuries are by reason of structures or conditions permanent in their nature, and their existence and maintenance is guaranteed or protected by the power of eminent domain or because the
interest of the public therein is of such an exigent nature that the
right of abatement at the instance of an individual is of necessity denied, it is open to either plaintiff or defendant to demand that permanent damages be awarded; the proceedings in such cases to some
extent taking on the nature of condemning an easement.6 2
Since the award of permanent damages entitles the intruder to use
the land permanently, it is clear enough that when permanent damages
are awarded, some of the landgwner's property is taken; unless he agrees
to the assessment of permanent damages, such a radical intrusion should
Id. at 502-03, 26 S.E. at 707; Clinard v. Town of Kemersville, 215 N.C. 745, 3
S.E.2d 267 (1939). In this case the Court held that
[t]he damages are to be ascertained upon the basis of the difference between the fair and reasonable market value of the property just before the
defendant began to use the stream and the fair and reasonable market value
thereof just after the beginning of such use, assessed upon the theory that
the defendant at that time took and appropriated an interest in the property of the plaintiffs for which it must pay.
Id. at 752, 3 S.E.2d at 273. In Lambeth v. Southern Power Co., 152 N.C. 371, 67
S.E. 921 (1910), the Court approved an instruction given by the trial court on
permanent damages that the recovery was to be "the difference between the fair
market value of the land before the right of way and easement was taken, and its
impaired value, directly, materially and proximately resulting ....

."

Id. at 372, 67

S.E. at 922.
00 Barclift v. Norfolk & S.R.R. 175 N.C. 114, 95 S.E. 39 (1918); Lassiter v.
Norfolk & C.R.R., 126 N.C. 509, 36 S.E. 48 (1900)
"Rhodes v. City of Durham, 165 N.C. 679, 81 S.E. 938 (1914). A common
way of expressing this is to say that either party has the option to insist (in" a
proper case) upon the assessment of permanent (i.e., prospective) damages. See
Note, 7 N.C.L. REv. 464 (1929). Ordinarily, however, the defendant is seeking
assessment of permanent damages.
02 Rhodes v. City of Durham, 165 N.C. 679, 680, 81 S.E. 938, 939 (1914).
See
also Clinard v. Town of Kernersville, 215 N:C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939) ; Webb v.
Virginia-Carolina Chem. Co., 170 N.C. 662, 87 S.E. 633 (1916).
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And,
be limited to cases in which there is a real justification for it.
conversely, the landowner cannot have permanent damages "as a matter
of right" except where public interest dictates. This usually means that
the defendant must have the power of eminent domain, which would be
indicative of the public interest in allowing defendant to "trespass" permanently. In one case, 4 Justice Barnhill went so far ag to say that the
right to permanent damages for diminution in land value exists only
against defendants with power of eminent domain. This seems too narrow, because other public interests may intervene to justify permanent
damages, although this would be rare. In any event, Justice Barnhill in
the same case espoused the broader formula, which would afford a recovery of permanent damages when the permanence of the trespass is
guaranteed either by the power of eminent domain or some other public
interest. 5
Most of the cases in North Carolina involve takings by railroads"0
or utilities0 7 or by some arm of government;" s since all these agencies
have eminent domain powers,"9 it seems appropriate to allow assessment
of permanent damages when their intrusions on land are in fact physically
permanent in nature and are required in the public interest. Indeed by
statute in the case of railroads, permanent damages must be assessed. 70
"'See Leigh v. Garysburg Mfg. Co., 132 N.C. 167, 43 S.E. 632 (1903) (permanent damages available only when defendant's activity is "impressed with a
public use").
, Clinard v. Town of Kernersville, 215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 276 (1939).
Id. at 750, 3 S.E.2d at 280.
E.g., Barclift v. Norfolk & S.R.R., 175 N.C. 114, 95 S.E. 39 (1918) ; Campbell
v. Raleigh & C.R.R., 159 N.C. 586, 75 S.E. 1105 (1912); Pickett v. Atlantic Coast
Line R.R., 153 N.C. 148, 69 S.E. 8 (1910); Dale v. Southern Ry., 132 N.C. 705,
44 S.E. 399 (1903) ; Lassiter v. Norfolk & C.R.R., 126 N.C. 509, 36 S.E. 48 (1900);
Beach v. Wilmington & W.R.R., 120 N.C. 498, 26 S.E. 703 (1897).
"'Lambeth v. Southern Power Co., 152 N.C. 371, 67 S.E. 921 (1910) (power
company); Phillips v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 130 N.C. 513, 41 S.E. 1022, rev'd
on other grounds, 131 N.C. 225, 42 S.E. 587 (1902) (telegraph company).
" Lyda v. Town of Marion, 239 N.C. 265, 79 S.E.2d 726 (1954) ; McKinney
v. City of High Point, 239 N.C. 232, 79 S.E.2d 730 (1954) ; McKinney v. City of
High Point, 237 N.C. 66, 74 S.E.2d 440 (1953); City of Raleigh v. Edwards, 235
N.C. 671, 71 S.E.2d 396 (1952); Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 57
S.E.2d 377 (1950) ; Davenport v. Drainage Dist., 220 N.C. 237, 17 S.E.2d 1 (1941) ;
Clinard v. Town of Kernersville, 215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939); Anderson v.
Town of Waynesville, 203 N.C. 37, 164 S.E. 583 (1932); Rhodes v. City of Durham, 165 N.C. 679, 81 S.E. 938 (1914).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-183 (1965) (utilities); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 62-220 (1965)
(railroads); N.C. GENT. STAT. §§ 73-1 to -28 (1965) (mills). This is only a sampling. There are some seventy different entities authorized to condemn in North
Carolina. Phay, The Eminent Domain Procedure of North Carolina: The Need
for Legislative Actions, 45 N.C.L. Rnv. 587, 591 n.10, 639-41 (1967).
" N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-51 (1953).
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Most permanent damages cases do not involve a physical structure
built directly upon the plaintiff's land. They involve instead indirect entries upon the land. A railroad culvert is not large enough and water backs
up on the plaintiff's land,71 or a city sewage plant pollutes a stream running through the plaintiff's land 2--these are the typical situations involved. Some of the cases, however, involve direct entry upon the land
and construction of a permanent structure there.73 So far the Court has
not drawn any distinction between the two situations.74 Even though a
,' Davenport v. Drainage Dist., 220 N.C. 237, 17 S.E.2d 1 (1941) (canal clogged,

water ponded on plaintiff's land); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Nichols, 187 N.C. 153,
120 S.E. 819 (1924) (diversion of surface waters); Barclift v. Norfolk &
S.R.R., 175 N.C. 114, 95 S.E. 39 (1918) (diversion of water in ditches); Pickett
v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 153 N.C. 148, 69 S.E. 8 (1910) (diversion of waters
from natural course); Dale v. Southern Ry., 132 N.C. 705, 44 S.E. 399 (1903)
(filled a ditch, backing up water on plaintiff's land); Lassiter v. Norfolk &
C.R.R., 126 N.C. 509, 36 S.E. 48 (1900) (ponding and diverting water, exceeding right to discharge water in natural course); Beach v. Wilmington & W.R.R.,
120 N.C. 498, 26 S.E. 703 (1897) (railroad construction caused flooding); Ridley v. Seaboard & R.R.R., 118 N.C. 996, 24 S.E. 730 (1896) (road-bed and bridge
caused ponding of water on plaintiff's land).
'Veazey v. City of Durham, 231 N.C. 357, 57 S.E.2d 377 (1950); Clinard
v. Town of Kernersville, 215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939) (stream pollution);
Rhodes v. City of Durham, 165 N.C. 679, 81 S.E. 938 (1914) (stream pollution).
Other non-trespassory invasions or takings include those resulting from construction, outside the land, of an unsightly and glare-producing water tank. McKinney
v. City of High Point, 239 N.C. 232, 79 S.E.2d 730 (1954) ; McKinney v. City of
High Point, 237 N.C. 66, 74 S.E.2d 440 (1953); City of Raleigh v. Edwards, 235
N.C. 671, 71 S.E.2d 396 (1952).
"'Lambeth v. Southern Power Co., 152 N.C. 371, 67 S.E. 921 (1910) ; Cherry
v. Lake Drummond Canal & Water Co., 140 N.C. 422, 53 S.E. 138 (1906); Phillips v. Postal Tel. Cable Co., 130 N.C. 513, 41 S.E. 1022, revd on other grounds,
131 N.C. 225, 42 S.E. 587 (1902). In some of the cases involving ponding of
water, it is also clear that the defendant has physically entered the land at some
point. There is also Fore v. Western N.C.R.R., 101 N.C. 526, 8 S.E. 335 (1888),
where a railroad, with no authority to condemn gardens, built its road in plaintiff's
garden and within thirty feet of his house. See discussion in Dobbs, Part I 46-49.
"' Such a distinction is made in W. PROSSER, ToRTs § 13, at 75 (3d ed. 1964).
Dean Prosser cites Cherry v. Lake Drummond Canal & Water Co., 140 N.C. 422,
53 S.E. 138 (1906), in support of the view that permanent damages may be recovered where there is actual trespass without regard to permanency in fact. W. PRosSER, § 13, at 75. That case does in fact lend some support to his view. There was a

canal company as trespasser so an analogy was drawn to railroads and other
corporations and the requirement of "legal permanency" was satisfied. However,

the trespass consisted of an embankment of sand and mud dredged up from the
canal when it was deepened and widened and presumably could be removed. Thus,
the physical permanence of the trespass was doubtful. If permanent damages can
be allowed in this case, it may be because there was a physical trespass upon the
land, which distinguishes this from other cases. However, the Court in its discussion assumed that there were permanent damages, and hence put the case on
the same footing as any other permanent damages case, though the assumption
may have been unjustified. In any event, the Court did not purport to apply a
different rule for cases where there were physical trespasses to land as distinct
from cases where the permanent condition occurred off the plaintiff's land.
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corporation has eminent domain powers, however, it should not be privileged to enter at will and take property without following the procedures
prescribed by the legislature for a taking. Where there is bad faith, as
there is likely to be when a defendant builds its structure directly upon
the plaintiff's land, the Court might well force removal of the structure
by injunction or ejectment or might grant temporary damages in successive suits in order to force the condemner to follow the legislatively
prescribed procedures. There is at least one case that would support
such a view.75
Sometimes a defendant with no statutory power of eminent domain
erroneously builds a structure in whole or in part on another's land. In
some such cases, courts will force a removal of the structure either by
injunction 0 or in an ejectment7 7 action. However, if the structure is only
minimally trespassing, if the defendant acted in good faith and reasonably,
and if there are no special equities with the landowner or against the
defendant, courts usually refuse to force removal where to do so would
work a hardship upon the trespasser. 7' This, of course, is a matter of
equitable discretion. In such a case the Court would presumably assess
damages on a permanent basis and award the landowner the loss of value
of his property rather than allow him to bring successive trespass actions,
although this precise issue has not been adjudicated in North Carolina.70
In addition to the requirement of "legal permanency" of the structure-the requirement that it be "guaranteed" by the defendant's eminent
domain power or some other valid reason to allow the structure to
stand-the structure must be physically permanent. That is, it must be
the kind of structure that will not in the nature of things be removed.
If defendant builds a railroad or a highway the structure is physically
permanent; kept in repair, it will last indefinitely. This is not true if the
"Carolina & Nw. Ry. v. Piedmont Wagon & Mfg. Co., 229 N.C. 695, 51
S.E.2d 301 (1949). Here the Court stated:
The accepted doctrine, in most jurisdictions, now is that where a railroad
company proceeds to build its road upon land to which it has not acquired
title by condemnation or conveyance, the owner may have his action for
damages or for the value of the land, or may maintain ejectment or other
possessory action, or may enjoin the company from appropriating or using
such land, provided he proceeds with reasonable promptitude...
Id. at 698, 51 S.E.2d at 304.
" See pp. 351-65 infra (injunction).
"'See Flanniken v. Lee, 23 N.C. 293 (1840); City of Syracuse v. Hogan,
234 N.Y. 457, 138 N.E. 406 (1923).
See pp. 351-65 infra (injunction).
The general formula usually adopted (quoted in the text accompanying
note 62 supra) is broad enough to allow permanent damages in an appropriate
case of this sort.
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defendant deposits a load of ice on the plaintiff's land, and in such a
case, even if the defendant has eminent domain powers, there is no permanent damage to assess, and of necessity the plaintiff must recover
nominal damages or damages for any actual harm done rather than the
diminished value of the land.
3 ° is an example,
Veazey v. City of Durham
though a complicated one,
of the rule that the offending condition must be physically permanent to
justify assessment of permanent damages. There the defendant had a
leak in its sewer lines and as a result discharged sewage into a watercourse on plaintiff's land. The defendant was held to pay permanent
damages (for which it would acquire a right to transport sewage in a
proper manner), but was also enjoined to repair the leak. In other words,
the permanent damages are not assessed to compensate for damages that
could be avoided and were not permanent; permanent damages are assessed only when the structure is physically permanent, as well as legally
permanent in the sense that courts will not force its removal. The same
idea is behind the rule that denies permanent damages where the nuisance
or trespass results from the defendant's method of operation, which can
be changed and hence is not permanent. This was the situation, for example, in Webb v. Virginia.Carolina Chemical Co.,8' where defendant
operated a guano plant. The operation of the plant near the plaintiff's
house subjected the plaintiff to offensive odors, and he brought suit to
recover permanent damages. The trial court refused to submit his claim
for permanent damages and he appealed. The Supreme Court held that
the trial court was correct. Since the offensive odors were not necessarily
permanent-they resulted from activities of the defendant, not its structure- permanent damages were inappropriate. The Court said that
"[e]ntire damages may be recovered when the 'source of the injury is
permanent in its nature and will continue to be productive of injury independent of any subsequent wrongful act.' "" When, on the other
hand, injury may cease because the defendant ceases his conduct, permanent damages may not be recovered; in such a case there is no permanence of the conduct, which may change. Thus the rule is that permanent damages can be justified only where there is physical permanence
of the offending structure, as well as legal permanence.
In the reverse situation, the structure may be physically permanent,
"0231 N.C. 357, 57 S.E.2d 377 (1950).
81170
N.C. 662, 87 S.E. 633 (1916).
2 1d. at 664, 87
S.E. at 634, quoting Mast v. Sapp, 140 N.C. 533, 537-38, 53

S.E. 350, 353 (1906).
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but there is no eminent domain power nor any other special reason to
allow the intruder to condemn land. If the intruder builds a hamburger
stand on another's land, there may be some relief under a betterments
statutes or in equity if he has made a reasonable mistake and the landowner chooses to keep and use the structure.8 4 But the physical permanence of the structure does not justify allowing the entrepreneur to force
a sale of the land to himself through an award of permanent damages.
Physical permanence must be accompanied by a public interest in favor
of the intruder that justifies him in taking some or all of the land of
another at a valuation.8 5
In some situations, at least, landowners have been allowed to recover
both (1) permanent damages, i.e., the reduction in land value resulting
from the trespass, and (2) any other losses, such as crop damage, that
occurred up to the time of trial. In Lassiter v. Norfolk & CarolinaRail-

road,s6 the defendant railroad had ponded water and then had diverted it,
exceeding its right to discharge surface water in its natural course. This
was a trespass to the plaintiff's lands. The trial court allowed the plaintiff to recover permanent damages, but refused to allow the plaintiff also
to recover past damages. The Supreme Court on appeal held that, although the plaintiff was limited to one action for damages, and though
he was by statute to recover his "entire damages" in that one action,
"N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-340 (1953). This statute provides:
A defendant against whom a judgment is rendered for land may, at any
time before execution, present a petition to the court rendering the judgment, stating that he, or those under whom he claims, while holding the
premises under a color of title believed to be good, have made permanent
improvements thereon, and praying that he may be allowed for the improvements, over and above the value of the use and occupation of the land.
Id. The statute goes on to authorize assessment of the damages to the plaintiff
and the allowance to the defendant for improvements.
8" One who builds on the land of another, as a result of a good faith mistake
of ownership, is entitled either to remove the structure or to receive from the
landowner the increased value of the land, at the election of the landowner. Beacon
Homes, Inc. v. Holt, 266 N.C. 467, 146 S.E.2d 434 (1966); Navin, Contracts,
Survey of North Carolinz Case Law, 45 N.C.L. REV. 895, 898 (1967); Equitable
Remedies, Survey of North Carolina Case Law, 39 N.C.L. REV. 370, 371 (1961);
Note, Statute of Frauds-Part Performance-Damages, 15 N.C.L. REV. 203
(1937).
",In Leigh v. Garysburg Mfg. Co., 132 N.C. 167, 43 S.E. 632 (1903), a lumber company trespassed upon the plaintiff's timber lands by constructing a tramway across them for hauling timber out from lands beyond. When sued, the
lumber company asked that "permanent damages" be assessed so that it would
acquire a permanent right to the tramway easement. The Court held permanent
damages to be improper since the lumber company "was not a quasi public corporation, and its tramway was in no sense impressed with a public use." Id. at
172, 43 S.E. at 634.
88 126 N.C. 509, 36 S.E. 48 (1900).
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nevertheless he could also recover "yearly damages" already accrued,
such as crop damage done in the past. "The one is compensation for a
wrong; while the other is the conveyance of a right, as the allowance
of permanent damages under this act is in effect the condemnation of land
87
to the use of a statutory easement."
In other cases, however, only the reduction of the value of the land by
reason of the trespass is awarded, and in some of these cases the court has
seemed unusually reluctant to admit evidence of specific harm that bears
on the diminution in land value. In Clinardv. Town of Kernersville,8 the
defendant town polluted a stream and also straightened it in a way that
caused it to overflow. The plaintiff produced evidence that mosquitoes
had been more prevalent since this alleged nuisance and the trial court
admitted it, but on appeal the Court held that the evidence was inadmissible. It reasoned that the diminution in the value of the land was the
test of damages in a "permanent" nuisance situation like this one, and
that, therefore, specific harms were not elements of damages. Similarly,
9
in Fore v. Western North CarolinaRailroad,I
a railroad built its track
into the plaintiff's garden and within thirty feet of his house. The Court
in this case held that evidence of danger of fire was improperly admitted
since the danger of fire was not an injury done to it as property. Both
cases seem too narrow. Though diminution in the value of the land is the
test of recovery in permanent trespass cases, specific harms or dangers
do have bearing on the value. They are not conclusive evidence, but they
certainly seem relevant, and there is recognition of this in some of the
other cases. For example, in Hines v. City of Rocky Mount," the defendant city created a nuisance that caused sickness in the family. Even
though permanent damages were awarded, sickness was held relevant "on
the question of the diminished value of the property . . . ."" This seems
a more desirable approach than the relatively narrower one taken in
the Fore and Clinard cases.
INJUNCTION AGAINST TRESPASS

in general-types of injunctions
It is probably accurate to say that an injunction will issue today to
enjoin trespass where there is a genuine need for it and where there is no
87
Id. at 513, 36 S.E. at 49.
88215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939).
101 N.C. 526, 8 S.E. 335 (1888).
162 N.C. 409, 78 S.E. 510 (1913).
01

162 N.C. 413, 78 S.E. 511. See D.
§ 100 (2d ed. 1963).
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special reason to deny the injunction, although historically courts showed
considerable reluctance to let an injunction go against trespass.02 The
ancient formula is that the injunction will not issue at all if there is an
adequate remedy at law, 3 and this rule remains current though sometimes ignored94 In any event, there has been an enormous shift in the
concept of what remedies at law are adequate, so that it is probably fair
to say that if the plaintiff has any real need for the injunction, his remedies at law are inadequate and the injunction will issue. 5
" Dunkart v. Rinehart, 87 N.C. 224 (1882) (injunction will be denied absent
threat of irreparable injury, and cutting trees by solvent trespasser not irreparable); McCormick v. Nixon, 83 N.C. 113 (1880) (denying preliminary injunction against timber cutting where both parties claimed title); German v.
Clark, 71 N.C. 417 (1874) (injunction against heirs entering land denied to
creditors absent threat of irreparable injury); Bell v. Chadwick, 71 N.C. 329
(1874) (denying injunction where injury to land is not irreparable and defendant
is not insolvent); Thompson v. McNair, 62 N.C. 121 (1867) (denying injunction where plaintiff had not proved insolvency of defendant); Gause v. Perkins,
56 N.C. 177 (1857) (denying injunction before title is proved, probably to preserve right of defendant to jury trial and to avoid halting production of turpentine from the land); Lyerly v. Wheeler, 45 N.C. 267 (1853) (decided in a period
when actions in equity were tried without a jury; denied injunction). A statute
put an end to the old requirement of insolvency of the defendant as a prerequisite
to injunction. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-486 (1953), first passed in 1885. N.C. Laws
1885, ch. 401. The statute had an immediate liberalizing effect, as can be seen
in John L. Roper Lumber Co. v. Wallace, 93 N.C. 22 (1885), where the court
again denied an injunction, but this time appointed a receiver to account for the
income from the land until a final decision as to title could be had.
Waste and nuisance, though often closely resembling trespass, were enjoined
without much reluctance. See, e.g., Jones, Lee & Co. v. Britton, 102 N.C. 166,
9 S.E. 554 (1889) ("injury in the nature of waste").
"' Most of the issues arise on preliminary injunction and before a full trial
on the merits; in such cases courts usually purport to require a showing of "irreparable injury" before an injunction will issue. This appears to be merely an
emphatic way of saying that plaintiff must genuinely need such emergency relief
before it will be granted and that other relief available is not adequate. Puryear
v. Sanford, 124 N.C. 276, 32 S.E. 685 (1899); Frink v. Stewart, 94 N.C. 484
(1886) ("it must appear that he will, or may, probably suffer irreparable injury
in some way" if injunction is denied); German v. Clark, 71 N.C. 417 (1874)
(court "will not enjoin a mere trespass unless irreparable damage is threatened").
In the absence of a claim of title or right to immediate possession by the defendant, however, the normal concern is simply with whether there is another
adequate remedy. See Kistler v. Weaver, 135 N.C. 388, 47 S.E. 478 (1904). If
the f'-espass is continuing or repeated and without a claim of right, it is usually
assumed that the remedy in damages is not adequate and an injunction is issued.
Cobb v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 172 N.C. 58, 89 S.E. 807 (1916); Combs v.
County Comm'rs, 170 N.C. 87, 86 S.E. 963 (1915); Wood v. Woodley, 160 N.C.
17, 75 S.E. 719 (1912) (defendant's claim of title clearly insubstantial, injunction
issued); Roper Lumber Co. v. Richmond Cedar Works, 158 N.C. 162, 73 S.E.
902 (1912).
9,When the trespass is repeated or continuous, there is seldom any discussion
of adequacy of other remedies. See, e.g., Cobb v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 172

N.C. 58, 89 S.E. 807 (1916).

" Absent a title dispute or undue hardship on the defendant, an injunction will
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It is important, however, to distinguish the temporary restraining
order from the preliminary injunction,9 6 and to distinguish each of these
from the "permanent" injunction. The temporary restraining order is
granted, if at all, on exa parte application of the plaintiff, and defendant
has no opportunity to be heardY For this reason, courts are properly
reluctant to issue temporary restraining orders, and statutes limit the
period of time in which they may remain in effect.9" The preliminary injunction or "interlocutory" injunction issues, if at all, on notice to the
defendant, who then has an opportunity to be heard.9 9 The hearing,
however, is usually incomplete as compared with a full-scale trial, and
very often the decision of the trial judge to grant or deny injunctive
relief at the preliminary stage is made on affidavits of the various
parties.1 0 Here again, there is good reason for reluctance in issuing
such injunctions, and consequently a pressing need must be shown by the
plaintiff in order to obtain such an injunction; this ordinarily means that
the plaintiff must show the danger of "irreparable injury" if he wishes
to obtain either a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction. 0 1 Although a jury trial is normally granted in the trial of equity
almost always issue to prevent a "continuous" or repeated trespass and in such
cases adequacy of legal remedies is seldom even mentioned. See, e.g., United
States v. Colvard, 89 F.2d 312 (4th Cir. 1937); Cobb v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R.,
172 N.C. 58, 89 S.E. 807 (1916); Combs v. County Comm'rs, 170 N.C. 87, 86
S.E. 963 (1915); Wood v. Woodley, 160 N.C. 17, 75 S.E. 719 (1912) (title dispute, but since defendant's claim of title was insubstantial, injunction issued);
Roper Lumber Co. v. Richmond Cedar Works, 158 N.C. 161, 73 S.E. 902 (1912).
'The terminology "temporary restraining order" and "preliminary injunction" appears in Rule 65 of the proposed N.C. RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (which
is taken from Rule 65 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE). N.C. Laws
1967, ch. 954, § 1. The code terminology in North Carolina is parallel, but not
identical. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-485 (1953) refers to "temporary injunctions,"
which are roughly equivalent to the temporary restraining orders. The "preliminary injunction" is often referred to in decisions of the Court as an "interlocutory" injunction and often the Court speaks of "continuing the injunction."
This also refers to what is in effect the grant of the preliminary injunction.
"'N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-485, -489 (1953). Under the code, an ex parte restraining order is effective only twenty days, after which time a hearing must be
had if the injunction is to continue in the form of a preliminary injunction. N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-490 (1953). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 65; Rule 65 of the proposed N.C. RULES OF
" N.C. GEN. STAT.
"N.C. GEN. STAT.
proposed N.C. RULES

CIVIL PROCEDURE, N.C. Laws 1967, ch. 954, § 1.
§ 1-490 (1953) (twenty days).
§§ 1-490, -491 (1953); FED. R. CIv. P. 65; Rule 65 of the
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, N.C. Laws 1967, ch. 954, § 1.

10 E.g., Clinard v. Lambeth, 234 N.C. 410, 67 S.E.2d 452 (1951). The basis
for relief on the ex parte temporary restraining order is, of course, almost always
affidavit or limited testimony by the plaintiff. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-489 (1953).
Under the Federal Rules an opportunity to offer evidence must be afforded if deR. Civ. P. 65.
manded, even at the preliminary stage. FED. 276,
32 S.E. 685 (1899); Frink v.
... E.g., Puryear v. Sanford, 124 N.C.
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cases in North Carolina," 2 it is not granted in cases of temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions, and the defendant in an injunction case gets a jury trial only on the final hearing for the "permanent" injunction.'0 3 Thus, procedurally, the temporary restraining
order and preliminary injunction are disadvantageous to the defendant,
and the plaintiff's case must be more pressing when he seeks these remedies than when he seeks only a "permanent" injunction granted after a
full-scale trial.
Adequacy of legal remedy

Classically an injunction would not issue to prevent trespass to land
unless the legal remedy was inadequate. But the mere fact that the plaintiff can recover money in a law action is not ordinarily an adequate legal
remedy for trespass if the trespass is repeated or continuous, 1 ' and a
statute so provides."0 5 Put a different way, if the defendant commits a
single isolated trespass, plaintiff has no need for an injunction unless
further trespasses are impliedly or expressly threatened. But if the trespass is either continuous, as where defendant leaves debris on plaintiff's
land, or repeated, as where defendant enters the land anew every day, no
money judgment will protect plaintiff's right to enjoy exclusive possession of his land, and an injunction will issue to forbid the trespass
unless there is some reason to hold otherwise. There are earlier decisions
showing a strong reluctance to grant injunctions against trespass, but
around 1900 the North Carolina Supreme Court came to recognize that
to deny a needed injunction was to reduce valuable property rights and
to sanction a kind of private eminent domain.'
Stewart, 94 N.C. 484 (1886). The idea is often expressed as a rule that equity

"will not enjoin a mere trespass unless irreparable damage is threatened," as in
German v. Clark, 71 N.C. 417, 420 (1874). However, it now seems clear that
it is not the trespass that evokes such a rule, but the fact that a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order is sought, and that procedural protection
for the defendant's rights is very limited in such cases.
I" Van Hecke, Trial by Tury in Equity Cases, 31 N.C.L. REv. 157 (1953).
10 Cf. Fremont v. Baker, 236 N.C. 253, 72 S.E.2d 666 (1952). This is
necessarily so, of course, where a temporary restraining order is sought ex parte

under N.C.

GEN. STAT.

§ 1-485 and § 1-489. The practice is, however, that the

judge rather than the jury decides the preliminary injunction issue also. See
A.

MCINTOSii,

NORTH

CAROLINA

PRAICE & PROCEDURE

§ 2216 (2d ed. 1956).

"",See cases cited note 95 supra. The older view to the contrary, as expressed
in such cases as Frink v. Stewart, 94 N.C. 484 (1886), is now clearly overruled.
This statute provides:
105 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-486 (1953).
In an application for an injunction to enjoin a trespass on land it is not
necessary to allege the insolvency of the defendant when the trespass
complained of is continuous in its nature, or is the cutting or destruction of
timber trees.
.06
The first clear recognition of this point seems to have been Roper Lumber

1969]

TRESPASS TO LAND

Apart from cases in which the trespass is continuing or repeated, an
injunction is proper in any case where there is a real need for it. If the
plaintiff is in possession of realty, he may obtain an injunction preventing defendant from dispossessing him.10 7 If defendant threatens by act
or word to destroy or damage ornamental trees or shrubs, an injunction
is proper, since trees cannot usually be replaced, certainly not with any
ease, and since in any event it would be almost impossible to put a suitable money value on such items.' 8 This is a classic illustration of inadequacy of a damages claim at law. On this same principle, courts will
enjoin a trespass that tends to destroy valuable wildlife and hunting
privileges.0 9 A similar rule is that an injunction will go to protect
against "waste" or against a destruction of the "inheritance" or freehold." 0
Co. v. Richmond Cedar Works, 158 N.C. 162, 73 S.E. 902 (1912), where the
Court said:
It would be a most extraordinary destruction of the rights of property
if a private corporation, possessing no power of eminent domain, could
seize the lands of another, to which it had no semblance of title, and appropriate them to its own use, simply because it was able to respond in
damages.
Id. at 164-65, 73 S.E. at 903.
The liberalizing trend, however, first began with the enactment of present
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-486 (1953), in 1885, providing that an injunction might
issue even though the defendant was not shown to be insolvent.
...
Banks v. Parker, 80 N.C. 157 (1879). The Court here said that "[a] person
in the quiet possession of real estate as owner may obtain an injunction to restrain others from dispossessing him by means of process growing out of litigation to which he was not a party." Id. at 159.
10 As to the measure of damages, see pp. 338-40 supra. Some courts have now
held that where ornamental trees are destroyed by trespass, the landowner may
recover the cost of replacement. Samson Constr. Co. v. Brusowankin, 218 Md.
458, 147 A.2d 430 (1958); Huber v. Serpico, 71 N.J. Super. 329, 176 A.2d 805
(App. Div. 1962).
10' Swan Island Club v. Ansell, 51 F.2d 337 (4th Cir. 1931).
Here the plaintiff allegedly owned a large acreage of marshy land suitable chiefly for hunting
wild waterfowl. Defendant allegedly trespassed under a claim of right, setting up
duck blinds and shooting. This allegedly would destroy gaming rights and render
the property substantially valueless. Since the gaming rights were unique and
not readily susceptible to measurement, the court considered the injury irreparable
and considered that damages would be inadequate. Hence it held that an injunction might issue.
In Council v. Sanderlin, 183 N.C. 253, 111 S.E. 365 (1922), the plaintiff conveyed land, which by wnesie conveyances passed to defendant. In the initial
conveyance plaintiff reserved "the right to hunt" and the "power to protect the
game on said land against the trespass of all persons." Defendants, who leased
the land from the then present owner allegedly interfered with the plaintiff's hunting rights. After holding that the reservation of hunting rights was a "profit
a prendre," the Court held that an injunction would issue to enjoin intereference
with it. This is not, of course, strictly a "trespass" case, since the plaintiff has
no possessory estate, but it is closely analogous.
.10 Richardson v. Richardson, 152 N.C. 705, 68 S.E. 217 (1910); Latham v.
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Timber cutting and other forms of exploiting land resources have
presented a special problem. The old view of the Court was that an
injunction should not issue to prevent timber-cutting and similar development of natural resources."1 There were at least three strands of
reasoning: (1) when both plaintiff and defendant claim title, there is
no ground for a preliminary injunction; title should be decided in an
action at law ;12 (2) unless defendant is insolvent, he can pay damages,
and if it turns out that he is in fact a trespasser, damages is an adequate
remedy;113 (3) it is good policy to develop natural resources and send
"the valuable products of our forests" into the "tide of trade.""' 4 All
of these views have undergone some change.
First, by statute, insolvency is no longer relevant, at least in most
injunction cases, and injunction may issue to prevent a trespass even
where the defendant is solvent." 5
Second, there has been a statutory change in policy concerning the
exploitation of natural resources. 1 6 Where at one time it was widely
regarded as desirable to cut timber and clear arable land,"' conservation of resources rather than immediate and hurried exploitation of
them is regarded as more important today." 8 Thus, a statute appears to
provide that where both parties assert a bona fide claim of title to timber,
Lumber Co., 139 N.C. 9, 51 S.E. 780 (1905) (contingent remainderman cannot
recover damages for waste but may obtain injunction); Jones, Lee & Co. v.
Britton, 102 N.C. 166, 9 S.E. 554 (1889) (injunction issued against "an injury in
the nature of waste" to protect judgment creditor who had lien outstanding against
the land).
In Lyerly v. Wheeler, 45 N.C. 267 (1853), the Court said that an injunction
against trespass would issue only if title is proved or undisputed and if the trespass "is attended with permanent results." Later cases make it clear, however,
that, although permanent damage is one ground in favor of granting an injunction,
it is no longer a required ground.
...
Bell v. Chadwick, 71 N.C. 329 (1874); Gause v. Perkins, 56 N.C. 177
(1857).
..
2 See pp. 359-61 infra.
... Frink v. Stewart, 94 N.C. 484 (1886); Dunkart v. Rinehart, 87 N.C.
224 (1882); Thompson v. McNair, 62 N.C. 121 (1867).
114 To issue an injunction against timber cutting or production of turpentine
would cause
not only much private loss, but great detriment to the public. Fields already cleared would lie idle, woodland that, in a country like ours, ought
to be cut down and cultivated, would stand wild and unproductive, and the
valuable products of our forests would no longer swell in the tide of trade.
Gause v. Perkins, 56 N.C. 177, 179 (1857).
...
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-486 (1953).
"10
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-487 (1953).
7
"

See, e.g., note 114 supra.

Some states reached this position through judicial change. See Pardee v.
Camden Lumber Co., 70 W. Va. 68, 73 S.E. 82 (1911).
11.
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an injunction may issue to prevent either from cutting it. The statute is
peculiarly worded and perhaps subject to some other interpretation, for
it provides only that the trial judge, when there is a bona fide title dispute, shall make "no order . ..permitting either party to cut said timber trees . . . ."11 It appears, however, that the Court has interpreted
this to mean that an injunction may issue against either or both parties. 20
A second statute provides that where one claimant has prima facie
title and a bona fide claim, and the other does not, the apparently bona
fide claimant may be permitted, after giving bond, to proceed to cut the
timber.'
This appears to imply that the other claimant shall be or may
be enjoined, and also that if both parties are bona fide claimants, an
injunction may issue against both. In effect, these statutes, then, appear
to allow an injunction on a preliminary assessment of the title. If a preliminary assessment by the trial judge indicates both parties claim
bona fide and make out prima facie titles, both may be enjoined from
cutting; if only one makes out a prima facie and bona fide claim, his
adversary may be enjoined.
Thus, in the timber-cutting cases there is a statutory reversal of the
older policy in favor of fast exploitation of land and a reversal of the
policy against determination of title on preliminary injunction.
Where the trespass does not involve timber cutting, however, the
statutes will not directly control. Even so, the policy in favor of exploitation of resources is probably now generally overridden by the policy
in favor of their orderly development, and it may well be that an injunction against other forms of land-resources development is appropriate in particular cases. This might be true, for example, if defendant's
11 N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-487 (1953).
1
..See Chandler v. Cameron, 227 N.C. 233, 41 S.E.2d 753 (1947); Kelly v.
Enterprise Lumber Co., 157 N.C. 175, 72 S.E. 957 (1911); Johnson v. Duvall,
135 N.C. 642, 47 S.E. 611 (1904). In Moore v. Fowls, 139 N.C. 50, 51 S.E.
796 (1905), the Court said:
Section 1 specifies certain conditions when the injunction shall not be
dissolved. Section 2 specifies a contingency when the court may permit
one of the parties to cut the timber ....
The legislature of 1901 [which enacted §§ 1-487 and 1-488] has
thrown greater safeguards around the rights of such litigants, and now,
when the plaintiff satisfies the judge that his claim is bono fide and that
he can show an apparent title to the timber, the judge should not dissolve
the injunction, but continue it until the title can be finally determined.
Id. at 52, 51 S.E. at 797. In Chandler v. Cameron, supra, the Court upheld an
order enjoining defendant from cutting timber, but held that absent a finding
of a bona fide and prima facie valid claim by plaintiff, he could not be permitted
to cut the timber either.
21 N.C. GEN.
11.
STAT. § 1-488 (1953).
See cases cited note 120 supra.
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exploitation of the land is at odds with its full development, or threatens
to exhaust the resources in an inefficient way, or is not consonant with
principles of conservation. Even if defendant is developing the land resources properly, the plaintiff may have a good claim for injunctive relief, since it may be difficult or impossible for him to measure the value
of what was taken from the land. In this situation, one solution may be to
appoint a receiver'2 3 who can keep accurate account of what is removed
from the land and the price received for it. In all these cases not
covered by the timber statutes, there remains the policy against making
determinations of title on preliminary injunction hearings. This is a
sound policy, though not invariably controlling, and it must be weighed
in the balance if both parties claim title.'4
Except where title is in issue, there is little evidence that the Court
is concerned about the relative adequacy of legal remedy; and injunctions issue in cases where a need is shown without great reluctance, again
excepting the case where title is in issue. This is the appropriate attitude
in North Carolina, certainly on permanent injunction, since there is no
denial of jury trial in the equity courts of North Carolina.
Hardshipsand equities
In any equity action, including those for injunctions, the "equities"
of the parties are considered; if the plaintiff has been inequitable in
some respect, relief may be denied to him in the court's discretion, even
though his conduct has not been illegal or tortious. Prejudicial delay, or
misleading conduct, however innocent, or unclean hands are all examples
of factors that may lead a court to deny equitable relief in balancing the
respective "equities" of the parties.
Courts may also deny relief, not only where the plaintiff has behaved
in some "inequitable" -way, but also where the grant of relief will impose
an undue hardship upon the defendant. This is an especially pertinent
consideration on a preliminary injunction. "An injunction of this nature," justice Ervin said in Huskins v. Yancey Hospital, I1c.,12 5 "should
be granted where the injury which the defendant would suffer from its
issuance is slight as compared with the damage which the plaintiff would
sustain from its refusal, if the plaintiff should finally prevail.' 1 20 And
the injunction should not issue "when its issuance would cause great injury to the defendant and confer little benefit in comparison upon the
.23
See pp. 366-68 infra.
'
See pp. 359-61 infra.
1238 N.C. 357, 78 S.E.2d 116 (1953).
'
Id. at 361, 78 S.E.2d at 120.
2
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plaintiff."' 12 7 These rules apply in any injunction case, but they are especially important where defendant's building encroaches on plaintiff's
128

land.
Thus, where one sues to enjoin a trespass, the injunction issues, not
of right, but in the court's discretion, and in exercising that discretion
the court will consider and balance the clarity of the plaintiff's right, the
plaintiff's need, the defendant's hardship, and the presence or absence of
inequitable conduct, and issue or deny the injunction as the balance seems
to indicate.
Plaintiff out of possession-transferringpossession or trying title
Neither a temporary restraining order nor a preliminary injunction
is issued in the usual case to "settle a dispute as to the possession of realty
or to dispossess one for the benefit of another."' 2 9 The normal remedy
to establish title and recover possession is the civil action analogous to
the common law action of ejectment. This action had and has three important characteristics: (a) the plaintiff had the burden of showing that
his title was good, and he could not recover merely because defendant's
title was weaker ;130 (b) a full-scale trial was held as in other civil actions ;131 (c) a jury determined disputed issues of fact." 2 If the plaintiff
who is out of possession is allowed to recover possession of realty by a
preliminary injunction, either the preliminary injunction must carry with
it these incidents, or the normal rules in title-trying actions will be
subverted.
For example, the injunction normally sought is either a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction. Though North Carolina
affords a jury trial in equity cases,'133 it does not do so on hearings for
restraining orders and preliminary injunctions.' 34 Nor, in such hearings,
217Id.

' See pp. 363-65 infra.
v. Armstrong, 230 N.C. 201, 203, 52 S.E.2d 362, 363 (1949);
accord, Huskins v. Yancey Hosp., Inc., 238 N.C. 357, 78 S.E.2d 116 (1953);
Young v. Pittman, 224 N.C. 175, 29 S.E.2d 551 (1944); Jackson v. Jernigan,
216 N.C. 401, 5 S.E.2d 143 (1939).
...
E.g., Bowers v. Mitchell, 258 N.C. 80, 128 S.E.2d (1962); Hayes v. Ricard,
244 N.C. 313, 93 S.E.2d 540 (1956); Locklear v. Oxendine, 233 N.C. 710, 65
S.E.2d 673 (1951).
...
As distinct from the attenuated hearing on preliminary injunction or the
entire absence of a hearing on a temporary restraining order. As to these, see
pp. 351-54 supra.
.2First Nat'l Bank v. Stone, 213 N.C. 598, 197 S.E. 132 (1938) (issues of
fact for jury in ejectment action).
...Van Hecke, Trial by Jury in Equity Cases, 31 N.C.L. REV. 157 (1953).
""Though the authorities on this are not clear, the practice is well established
and entirely proper, especially since, outside of term time, a jury could not readily
12 Armstrong
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is there a full-scale trial; rather the case is heard on affidavits and a
preliminary determination is made whether relief is justified. 80 If under
these conditions an injunction is issued, then the defendant is ousted
from possession without a jury trial or even an opportunity to cross examine witnesses. Furthermore, if the plaintiff is able to gain possession
in this manner, he will not need to bring an ejectment suit in which he
will have the burden of establishing his title, but rather may leave it to
the defendant to do so, with the result that by this maneuver the plaintiff
will have shifted the burden of proof to the defendant. Finally, to shift
possession before a full-scale trial is to favor the party out of possession
for no very obvious reason. Until a trial is held, one does not know
which party has the better claim, at least not ordinarily, and absent unusual circumstances there is no justification for favoring the plaintiff
any more than defendant.'
In exceptional circumstances, however, the Court may transfer possession by injunction. In Young v. Pittman,17 the defendant was interfering with, or threatening to interfere with, plaintiff's claimed rights to
mine. Both parties claimed title. Defendants evidently barred "plaintiff's
right of ingress for the purpose of mining," but the Court approved a
preliminary injunction, which in effect put plaintiff in possession of the
mine. Although the Court recognized the usual rule that "a court of
equity will not interfere by injunction to determine a disputed question
of title to land, nor undertake to dispossess one party for the benefit of
another," it held that the injunction should issue. Apparently two factors
influenced the Court's decision. First, the defendant's claim of title appeared to be relatively weak, being based as it was on adverse possession,
while plaintiff's title was apparently a good paper title.'
Second, there
was strategic need for mica that plaintiffs would mine if in possession,
be called, and no jury could be called quickly enough to allow expeditious decision on the emergencies usually asserted in preliminary injunction cases. Cf.
Fremont v. Baker, 236 N.C. 253, 72 S.E.2d 666 (1952).
..See Clinard v. Lambeth, 234 N.C. 410, 67 S.E.2d 452 (1951). However,
under the Federal Rules an opportunity to offer evidence must be afforded. FED.
R. Civ. P. 65.
"' Under the statutes affecting timber cutting, an injunction is sometimes
permitted and it operates very substantially like one shifting possession. This
involves a preliminary determination that the party seeking injunction has "prima
facie" title and the other does not. See pp. 354-58 supra. Some similar standard
may well be appropriate in cases not involving timber, provided the ultimate
burden of proof on final hearing remains with the plaintiff, and is not shifted
when
the plaintiff regains possession.
3 12Z4 N.C. 175, 29 S.E.2d 551 (1944).
...
This is very similar to the standard prescribed by statute in the timbercutting situation. See pp. 356-57 supra.
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and the Court evidently believed that the mining would be slowed down
2
or halted if plaintiffs were kept out of possession."'
In Horton v. White, 4 ' the Court apparently also sanctioned at least
a partial transfer of possession under unusual circumstances. In that case
Sarah Horton brought an ejectment action to recover possession of land
occupied by White. Both parties claimed title. While the suit was pending and before it was decided, Sarah Horton gained possession of a portion of the disputed land in suit. White responded by obtaining a temporary restraining order and, on hearing, a preliminary injunction and
appointment of a receiver to secure the rents and profits of the parcel on
which Sarah had entered. The Supreme Court held this was proper.
The opinion does not make it entirely clear, but apparently this involved
a transfer of possession to White under the temporary restraining order
and a transfer of possession to the receiver on the preliminary injunction.
All this seems proper enough because in this case the transfer of possession
back to White had the effect of preserving the burden of proof, which
lay upon Sarah at the beginning of the ejectment action. So long as there
is a clear possession in one party immediately before an injunction is
sought, perhaps it is appropriate to transfer possession back to him by
preliminary injunction (assuming he shows a need for so drastic a remedy).
Thus, though ordinarily possession of land will not be transferred by
injunction, there are occasionally appropriate cases for the exercise of
such power. Whether the courts will transfer possession by a preliminary
injunction apparently depends on several factors: (1) Can the plaintiff
show a relatively clear right and the absence of one by defendant? (2)
Can the plaintiff show a genuine need for immediate possession as against
the need of defendant? (3) Can the possession be transferred without
allowing the plaintiff to evade the burden of proof as to title laid upon
him by the common law? If all these questions are answered "yes," then
a good case for transfer of possession by injunction is presented. At the
same time, the first two questions are matters of degree, and the decision
to grant the preliminary injunction is necessarily one of discretion rather
than a certain rule of law, even when all the *questions are answered
affirmatively.
This is very similar to consideration of relative hardship. See text accom...
panying notes 125-128 supra. It emphasizes, however, public interests more than
private ones.
S°84 N.C. 297 (1881).
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Transfer of possession by permanent injunction
Most of the cases involving transfer of possession of land by injunction turn on the fact that a temporary restraining order or a preliminary
injunction is in issue. As indicated previously, to issue a preliminary
injunction to put one into possession is to deny a jury trial and to allow
plaintiff to avoid his usual burden of proof. However, a permanent injunction in North Carolina is now treated like other civil actions, and
a jury trial is afforded as of right in equity cases just as in law cases.
The permanent injunction is issued after full scale trial, and the plaintiff
retains the burden of proof in such a trial. Thus, there seems no present
objection in North Carolina to the grant of a permanent injunction transferring possession or trying title, as distinguished from a preliminary
injunction. Indeed, ignoring the labels on the papers in the case, the suit
for a permanent injunction seems indistinguishable from the suit in ejectment, except that an injunction may be enforced expeditiously by proceedings for contempt if necessary. Although there is no clear authority,
it would seem that a permanent injunction might properly issue to transfer possession or settle title issues.
Continuing trespass and possession
Courts everywhere have tried to distinguish between a trespass that
is "continuous" and an entry upon land that actually ousts the occupier
and secures possession to the trespasser. A continuous trespass will be,
under proper circumstances, enjoined by preliminary injunction. Ordinarily if the trespasser goes beyond a "continuous trespass" and secures
possession, the remedy, if title is in dispute, is not preliminary injunction
but a suit in ejectment. Thus if an injunction is issued before final hearing
on a full-scale trial, courts are apt to stress that the trespass is continuous.
If the preliminary injunction is denied, the courts are apt to stress that
the trespass is not merely a continuous or repeated one, but is possession
by defendant against which no preliminary injunction will ordinarily
issue.Y4'
An observer on the land would find it difficult to distinguish by observation some cases of "possession" by defendant from some cases of
"continuous trespass" by him. Perhaps the distinction is less a description
of the parties' conduct than an expression of the conclusion that a preliminary injunction ought to issue. At any rate, the difficulty in distinguishing the two, whether the distinction is a factual or a conceptual one,
has appeared in several cases.
...
See pp. 359-61 sapra.
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In Huskins v. Yancey Hospital, Inc.,14 the defendant hospital had
built a driveway, used by its ambulances, on a strip of land claimed by
both the plaintiff and the defendant. The plaintiff sought to obtain an
interlocutory or preliminary injunction against the hospital's use of the
drive, contending that plaintiff was in possession of the disputed strip
and that the hospital's use was a "trespass of a continuous nature," so
that injunction would be justified. The Court held, however, that the
defendant hospital was not merely trespassing continuously, but was
instead "in possession," and, partly on the principle that "possession"
is not transferred by injunction, the preliminary injunction was denied.
As a matter of factual description, it is entirely possible to describe defendant's conduct as a repeated trespass by its ambulances, or a continuous
trespass by the paving on the drive rather than as "possession." The
conclusion to be drawn seems to be that the supposed dichotomy between
"continuing trespass" on the one hand and "possession" on the other is
not very helpful, and the Court probably is moved, as it properly should
be, by other factors altogether. This is borne out by the emphasis in
Huskins on the relative hardships of the parties-the need of the hospital
to use the disputed land, and the plaintiff's apparent lack of need for it.
Very probably the distinction between continuous trespass and possession
merely serves as a not very clear way of expressing a conclusion already
reached on other grounds. The supposed distinction, however, probably
does serve to remind us of the policies against significantly altering the
1
parties' relationship to the land on preliminary hearing.Mandatory injunctions to remove trespassing chattels
Ordinarily the injunction orders defendant to cease trespassing. If
defendant deposits debris on the land, however, it may be proper for the
court to order him to remove it by a mandatory injunction. 4 4 The man1" 238 N.C. 357, 78 S.E.2d 116 (1953).
13
See pp. 354-58 su~pra.
144 In Academy of Dance Arts, Inc. v. Bates, 1 N.C. App. 333, 161 S.E.2d 762
(1968), defendant dumped debris on plaintiff's land. A mandatory injunction
was held proper to require removal, with a sixty day time period afforded defendant to accomplish removal. It was not clear why the court regarded damages
as an inadequate remedy. However, a mandatory injunction seems more efficient
than damages, since plaintiff is not subjected to the risks and uncertainties of recovering damages. A similar, well-known case is Wheelock v. Noonan, 108 N.Y.
179, 15 N.E. 67 (1888), where defendant deposited a "few stones" by permission.
These turned out to be boulders 15 feet long. A mandatory injunction issued
here because removal by the landowner was not feasible. This case was cited
with approval in Leaksville Woolen Mills v. Spray Water Power & Land Co.,
183 N.C. 511, 515, 112 S.E. 24, 26 (1924).
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datory injunction might properly also require defendant to replace orna14
mental trees he has removed in the course of a trespass.
Historically there has been a reluctance to issue mandatory injunctions, at least in the preliminary stage before final hearing. As the Court
recognized in Clinard v. Lambeth,40 a mandatory injunction may require
the defendant to destroy something he has a right to have, and courts
must exercise restraint in granting such injunctions where the defendant
may be irreparably injured by compliance. This policy is usually expressed
by saying that the plaintiff must show a threatened injury that is immediate, irreparable, and clearly established.' 47
The mandatory injunction is less often associated with orthodox
trespass cases than it is with protection of easements and other interests
falling short of ownership in fee. The Court in CarolinaPower & Light
Co. v. Bowman, 4 ' implied that a power company was entitled to an injunction to force removal of a building erected upon its easement and under its
power lines upon a finding that the building interfered with the easement. In Leaksville Woolen Mills v. Spray Water Power & Land Co.,140
a mandatory injunction was issued commanding defendant to remove an
embankment blocking a roadway, which plaintiff claimed the right to use.
Although the defendant claimed title to the roadway, the Court thought
plaintiff had shown a clear right and palpable violation, or at least a
prima facie case, and hence the mandatory injunction issued without the
show of reluctance usually encountered when the title dispute covers more
than a right-of-way' 5 0 A similar result was reached where defendant
interfered with use of a road in violation of an injunction, and was ordered
by a mandatory injunction to restore the road to its former condition.1 '
Likewise a mandatory injunction has been issued to require defendant to
12
remove a structure that violates a restrictive covenant. r
45 The damages alternative may or may not be adequate. If replacement cost
is allowed as damages, perhaps the injunction would not be necessary. See pp. 33840 supra. On the other band, a mandatory injunction here would put the risks of
finding replacements and making them succeed in the soil on the defendant, where,
if he is at fault, it ought to be.
148234 N.C. 410, 67 S.E.2d 452 (1951).
147 "As a rule such an order will not be made as a preliminary injunction,
except where the injury is immediate, pressing, irreparable and clearly established,
or the party has done a particular act in order to evade an injunction which he
knew had been or would be issued." Id. at 418, 67 S.E.2d at 458, quoting A. McINTOSH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 851 (1st ed. 1929).
148229 N.C. 682, 51 S.E.2d 191 (1949).
149 183 N.C. 511, 112 S.E. 24 (1922).
...
See pp. 354-58 supra.
...
Keys v. Alligood, 178 N.C. 16, 100 S.E. 113 (1919).
...
Ingle v. Stubbins, 240 N.C. 382, 82 S.E.2d 388 (1954).
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Although these cases appear to protect one's interest in the use rather
than in the possession of land, there seems to be no reason to doubt that a
mandatory injunction will also issue in a "pure" trespassory situation as
well to protect one's right of possession. There must be, of course, a
genuine need for the injunctive relief, and where a mandatory injunction
is sought preliminary to a full-scale trial, the plaintiff's right must be
clear and its violation palpable. 53 But if these normal prerequisites are
met, a mandatory injunction presumably would issue.
There are several situations where injunctive relief, mandatory or
prohibitory, is ordinarily denied. Where anyone who has the power of
condemnation makes a "permanent" entry upon the land-as by constructing a structure-the plaintiff's remedy is usually an action of "inverse
condemnation" for permanent damages for the taking of his land." Thus
if a railroad or a public utility with condemnation powers encroaches
upon plaintiff's land without completing formal condemnation procedures,
The same is true when
an injunction does not issue to force remova3
one obtains permission of the State Highway Commission to locate a
structure upon a highway easement,:15 the fee in which belongs to the
adjacent landowner. This is, or may be, an additional burden upon the
fee; the plaintiff may be entitled to compensation, but he is not entitled
to force removal of the structure permitted by the Commission.: 5 7 Quite
possibly an injunction will be granted even against one who has the power
of condemnation if he acts in bad faith and deliberately enters plaintiff's
land without following the statutory procedures for condemnation. Short
of this, however, the normal remedy must be for damages for the "taking"
if the injury is permanent, or for normal trespass damages if there is
only a temporary injury.
...
Leaksville Woolen Mills v. Spray Water Power & Land Co., 183 N.C. 511,
112 S.E. 24 (1922).
...
See pp. 345-48 supra.
. See, e.g., Rhodes v. City of Durham, 165 N.C. 679, 81 S.E. 938 (1914)
("the right of abatement at the instance of an individual is of necessity denied").
See generally pp. 345-48 supra.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 136-18(10), -93 (1964) (Highway Commission to
authorize various installations, such as pipes or utility wires, on the highway
easement).
..Van Leuven v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 261 N.C. 539, 135 S.E.2d 640 (1965).
The Court stated:
The State Highway Commission had the right to grant the permit to
the defendant to lay its sewer line within the Commission's easement
across the property of the plaintiffs, but it did not and does not have the
power to relieve the defendant from liability to compensate the plaintiffs
for the added burden the State Highway Commission permitted the defendant to put upon the pre-existing easement.
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Mandatory injunctions to relieve encroaching permanent structures
In a number of cases the Supreme Court of North Carolina has approved a mandatory injunction to force removal of a structure that interferes with use of plaintiff's land or his easement. 18 A classic problem
in equity jurisprudence is slightly different and does not appear to have
been dealt with explicitly by the Court. This is the problem of the building
that encroaches very slightly upon the plaintiff's land, or overhangs it
slightly, or projects into it underground. In such cases the defendant is
a trespasser and plaintiff can recover damages. It is also clear that in
many such cases, the plaintiff can obtain a mandatory injunction to force
removal by the defendant.'5 9 In many cases, however, it will work an
unconscionable hardship upon the defendant if he is forced to remove the
building. He may occupy only the smallest portion of plaintiff's land at
no real harm to the plaintiff; but the cost of removing the building may
be enormous. Furthermore, if an injunction issues to compel defendant
to remove the building, the plaintiff may be tempted to engage in extortion
by offering to sell the land to the defendant at an exhorbitant price. If
the cost of removing the encroaching structure is very high, defendant
may well be forced to buy plaintiff's land, or part of it, at a price many
times its worth, rather than destroy the building that encroaches an inch
or two. Thus, to grant an injunction compelling removal of the building
may be a prelude to extortion by the plaintiff. 6 For these reasons, courts
usually balance hardships and grant or refuse an injunction on these facts
as seems indicated.' 6'
On the other hand, if injunctions are not granted to force removal
Id. at 544, 135 S.E.2d at 643. See also Van Leuven v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc.,

256 N.C. 610, 124 S.E.2d 560 (1962)

(evenly divided court affirmed refusal to

grant a mandatory injunction).
If the Commission condemns land for a highway and takes and pays for a fee,
of course the adjacent landowner has no complaint when structures are placed
upon the land taken by the Commission. Neither does he have any complaint if the
Commission takes less than a fee, but takes (and pays for) an easement authorizing not only use for highways but also use by "assigns" for utility poles, etc.
In such a case the plaintiff still owns the fee subject to the easement, but the
Commission has taken an easement "large" enough to cover the right to put
utility poles on it and there is thus no additional burden upon the fee at all. See
Hildebrand v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 221 N.C. 10, 18 S.E.2d 827 (1942).
..
8 Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Bowman, 229 N.C. 682, 51 S.E.2d 191
(1949); Leaksville Woolen Mills v. Spray Water Power & Land Co., 183 N.C.
511, 112 S.E. 24 (1922); Keys v. Alligood, 178 N.C. 16, 100 S.E. 113 (1919).
. Beaty v. Gordon, 236 Ark. 50, 364 S.W.2d 311 (1963); Tauscher v. Andruss, 240 Ore. 304, 401 P.2d 40 (1965).
100 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 941, comment c (1939).
161E.g., Golden Press, Inc. v. Rylands, 124 Colo. 122, 235 P.2d 592 (1951);
Tauscher v. Andruss, 240 Ore. 304, 401 P.2d 40 (1965).
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of encroachments, builders may be allowed to engage in a kind of private
eminent domain; they may feel free to "take" whatever land they need
by building on it intentionally or perhaps negligently, knowing that they
will not be forced to remove the structure. To prevent this, an injunction
to force removal of the structure should be granted in any case in which
the defendant intentionally builds a portion of his building upon the
plaintiff's land. And it should operate as a strong factor against the
defendant if he negligently builds across the line.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has not dealt directly with this
particular problem, although mandatory injunctions have been granted
to compel removal of a building that offended a deed restriction,' 62 and
to compel removal of structures that interfered with use of land or with
easements.6 3 In Huskins v. Yancey Hospital, Inc.,'" the encroaching
structure was a driveway used by ambulances at a hospital. Although
the Court did not specifically consider the high cost of removing the paving, it did indicate that it would balance the hardships to the defendant
and refuse to force removal when the plaintiff's need was small compared
to the extreme hardship on the defendant.
If a court refuses to force removal of a building that encroaches slightly upon plaintiff's land, the effect is that the trespass by the building becomes permanent, unless the structure itself is of the kind not likely to
last. This entitles either plaintiff or defendant to measure damages by
the "permanent damages" standard, that is, by the value of the land
taken. 6 ' This normally means that plaintiff will be compensated for the
land "taken" by the encroaching building and defendant will acquire title
to the land involved; the court's decree to this effect can, under statute,
be recorded as a deed. 66 However, there seems no reason to insist that
the land involved pass in fee simple to the defendant if the plaintiff wishes
to convey a lesser interest. For example, if plaintiff genuinely wishes
the land back, a decree might afford defendant the right to keep his building on it, but with provision for the land's reverting to plaintiff should
the building be destroyed. Of course, if such a provision (or some variation of it) is inserted in the decree, the defendant's liability in permanent
damages would not be liability for a fee simple; it would be liability
only for what he received, whatever it was. This obviously is not a serious
problem, since the amounts of land involved in encroachment cases are
...
Ingle v. Stubbins, 240 N.C. 382, 82 S.E.2d 388 (1954).
...
Cases cited note 157 supra.
104238 N.C. 357, 78 S.E.2d 116 (1953).
...
See
345-51 supra.
...
N.C.pp.
GEN. STAT. §§ 1-227, -228 (1953).
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usually small; but in a commercial area, such considerations may have
much weight. In any event, if injunction is denied, the parties should
provide a decree that makes title clear and should record it pursuant to
the statutory provisions.
RESTITUTIONARY MEASURES OF DAMAGES"WAIVER OF TORT AND SUIT IN ASSUMPSIT"

Defendant's gain as measure of recovery
Most commonly, the plaintiff in a trespass action seeks payment for

his losses, if he has any; if he has no pecuniary losses, he seeks to vindicate
his right to exclusive possession 6 7 by recovery of nominal or punitive
damages. 6 s Sometimes, however, the plaintiff's losses are quite small
while the trespasser has made either a real or a theoretical gain through
his trespass. Suppose, for example, the defendant occupies the plaintiff's
land for a year, and that the rental value of the land is 500 dollars for
that period of time. By his use of the land, however, defendant either
saves himself the expense of 1,000 dollars he would otherwise be required
to pay for similar land elsewhere, or he makes a profit of 1,000 dollars.
If plaintiff is limited to a recovery of his "loss" he will recover (at most)
500 dollars. If, however, he can recover what defendant has gained
through his wrongdoing, he will double his recovery. The recovery of
defendant's gain when there is no corresponding loss on the plaintiff's
part may be justified as preventing "unjust enrichment," and such a
recovery may be called, a little misleadingly, a restitutionary one.
Whether and under what circumstances such a recovery would be
allowed is not well settled, but a number of cases are important for both
comparison and distinction. At least two North Carolina decisions allow
a landowner to recover rents on his land actually collected from tenants
by the trespasser or his assignee.' 69 These decisions, like most related
cases, might traditionally be discussed as cases in which the plaintiff
"waives the tort and sues in assumpsit." Such a quaint expression is not
especially meaningful today, but it does serve to point up the fact that the
recovery of rent is presumably what the plaintiff would have recovered
had the trespasser contracted to lease the premises. In both cases, however, the recovery of the gain to the defendant is apparently also equal
to the loss of the plaintiff. Thus, the cases are easily explicable in terms
...
See Dobbs, Part I 36-46 (interest in possession as a dignitary interest).
"" See pp. 334-44 supra.
1 Womack v. Carter, 160 N.C. 286, 75 S.E. 1102 (1912); London v. Bear,
84 N.C. 226 (1881).

19691

TRESPASS TO LAND

of the normal tort damages aimed at compensating the plaintiff for his
loss.
There is at least one decision, however, that allows the landowner to
recover the reasonable rental value of the land used by the defendant. 7
In Leigh v. Garysburg Manufacturing Co., 171 the defendant took a timber

deed from the plaintiff covering the right to cut timber from plaintiff's
land for five years. The covenants between the parties also allowed the
defendant to construct a railroad on the land and to haul out timber both
from plaintiff's land and that of others. The defendant hauled out timber
from other lands after the five year period was over and thus trespassed
upon the plaintiff's land. The plaintiff was allowed to recover the reasonable rental value of the land occupied by defendant in hauling timber.
This decision seems entirely proper 172 and indeed is entirely in accord
with the recovery of mesne profits following an ejectment suit at common
law. However, it should be noticed that this is not necessarily the same
as the more common tort recovery based on plaintiff's losses, for the
plaintiff has lost the rental value of his land only if he has been prevented
from renting it by the trespass. It seems quite apparent that he was not
prevented from renting his land and his losses were not in fact pecuniary
at all. He lost the exclusive right to possession only, for which he was
entitled, clearly, to something; but his actual losses were not the rent.
Thus such a recovery is essentially a recovery of the defendant-trespasser's
gains, not the plaintiff's actual losses; such recoveries are often associated
with quasi-contract or restitution.
The profits made by the defendant in using the plaintiff's land are
not necessarily equivalent to rental value and may or may not be recoverable. If the landowner wishes to use the land himself and, in using it,
would have made profits, he has losses of that amount when the trespasser
deprives him of the land. If he can in fact prove these profits, he can
recover them on the usual bases that one recovers his losses. 3 Even if
1o

Where tangible items are removed from the land, the value of these items

may be recovered, and on this score there is not the problem that exists where
the defendant uses the land without diminishing its value. See generally pp. 334-44
supra.

132 N.C. 167, 43 S.E. 632 (1903).

' Accord, Raven Red Ash Coal Co. v. Ball, 185 Va. 534, 39 S.E.2d 231 (1946)
(discussing the assumpsit theory at length).
"'8In C.B. Coles & Sons v. Standard Lumber Co., 159 N.C. 183, 63 S.E. 736
(1909), the landowner contracted with B that B would purchase and remove
100,000 feet of lumber from the landowner's lumber yards. B did not remove

the lumber and the yard was blocked. The landowner alleged a loss of profits
resulting because the blocked yards shut his mill down. But the Court held that
on the facts the claim of lost profits was "too speculative and remote." On the
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he cannot prove them conclusively, he may argue that the profits made
by the trespasser in using the land constitute some evidence of his losses.174
In either case he is seeking to recover normal tort-damages compensation
for his loss. However, the landowner may argue differently; he may
argue that even if he, the landowner, has no losses, the trespasser should
not be allowed to profit by his trespass but instead should be required to
disgorge his unjust gain, including any profits he made. A similar argument can be made by the landowner when the trespasser does not make
tangible profits by his use of the land, but does save himself expenses he
otherwise would have had. Cases like Leigh,171 where reasonable rental
value of the land used by the defendant is awarded, do not necessarily
authorize recovery of profits made by defendant's use of the land where
the plaintiff has no losses. It is one thing to require a trespasser to pay
the market value of what he takes even though the landowner has lost
nothing; it is entirely another to require a trespasser to pay more than
the market value of what he takes as well as more than the landowner
has lost.
Recovery of the trespasser's profits-or his savings of expense-in
excess of rental value is probably warranted only when the trespasser
acts in bad faith, that is, when he intentionally trespasses knowing he
In this situation, some courts
has no honest claim of right to the land.'
have allowed recovery of profits. One of the leading cases is Edwards v.
Lee's Administrator,7 7 where defendants owned an underground cave
under their own land, which connected with a cave under the plaintiff's
land. The cave under plaintiff's land was 360 feet below the surface and
had no entrance except the entrance through defendant's property. Defendants operated their cave as a commercial attraction and included in
the operation the portion of the cave under plaintiff's land. The Kentucky
court specifically found the trespasses were willful, not innocent, and
allowed a proportionate recovery of the profits from the defendant's business. The court recognized that the usual recovery was reasonable value
-which of course did not exist here, since there could be no access to the
portion of the cave under plaintiff's land. However, the court reasoned
other hand, the Court recognized that B who failed to remove according to his
contract, was liable "for the use and occupation-that is, a fair rental value of
the yard." See also note 174 infra.
For cases where profits were unrecoverable, see pp. 343-44 supra.
...
See Capitol Garage Co. v. Powell, 98 Vt. 303, 127 A. 375 (1925).
...
Leigh v. Garysburg Mfg. Co., 132 N.C. 167, 43 S.E. 632 (1903).
As to liability for unintended trespass, see Dobbs, Part I 32-36.
...
'1265 Ky. 418, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (1936).
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that rental value was really intended as a "convenient yardstick by which
to measure the proportion of profit derived by the trespasser directly from
the use of the land itself." Hence, when the yardstick was unavailable,
the court thought it appropriate to turn directly to profits of the defendant
as the appropriate measure. Whatever the theory, it is apparent that the
plaintiff was awarded something in this famous case that he had not lost.
Although such an award may be justified in many cases of willful trespass,
it seems arguable on these facts that the defendant's gain was not necessarily unjust. While restitutionary recoveries to prevent unjust enrichment are desirable, some care may be required to avoid simply enforcing
a harsh forfeiture against a trespasser in the name of justice. There
should be satisfactory evidence that the trespasser acted in bad faith and
there should be an absence of any exculpating or mitigating factors before
the landowner is given a windfall to prevent the defendant's enrichment.
For example, in a Connecticut case,1 ts a sheriff attached property of certain
debtors in a building owned by the plaintiff by wrongfully padlocking
the building. Unless the plaintiff lost opportunities to rent his premises
because of the padlock or the sheriff was acting in bad faith, there seems
no reason to hold the sheriff liable for the theoretical rental value of the
building. The landlord's actual losses, such as rent he was prevented
from obtaining, would surely furnish a more just recovery. Since the
issue is only one of damages or remedy and not one of primary right,
there is no reason why courts cannot take such matters into account on
a case-by-case basis and award the higher resitutionary recovery only
where it is clearly justified.
Presumably North Carolina will allow recovery of profits made from
use of the land by a deliberate tortfeasor, and would likewise allow recovery of any savings made by such a torifeasor's use of the land, although
there seem to be no decisions precisely on point. For this reason some
attention must be given to the historical reluctance of many courts to
allow "assumpsit" for use and occupation of land by a trespasser.
"Waiver of tort and suit in assumpsit"
In the case of certain torts, notably conversion of personal property, 179
common law courts allowed the plaintiff at his option either a suit in tort
(trover) or a suit in contract (assumpsit). If the plaintiff chose the tort
action, his damages would be the value of the property at the time of
...
Chapel-High Corp. v. Cavallaro, 141 Conn. 407, 106 A.2d 720 (1954).
...
A leading modern case is Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282,
173 P.2d 652 (1946) (discussing the principle extensively).
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conversion; if he chose to "waive the tort and sue in assumpsit," his
damages might be the value of the property when it was resold by the
defendant at a higher price. The assumpsit was the "implied assumpsit"
or quasi-contract in which the courts fictionally implied a promise by the
defendant to pay the gain he derived from the property (the resale price).
Once the common law fictions are laid aside, this amounts to saying only
that either of two measures of damages may be appropriate in certain
cases, one of which is the plaintiff's loss and the other of which is the
defendant's (unjust) gain.
In many cases, however, lawyers of earlier times took their fictions
seriously. When they spoke of waiving the tort and suing in assumpsit
they thought of the case as having acquired all the characteristics of a
contract suit; it was more than a quaint way of saying that the plaintiff
had some options about damages. This meant that the case was now a
contract case, not only in the sense that damages would be based upon
gain to the defendant, but that it was also a contract case for purposes
182
of venue,' or jurisdiction of courts,' or the statute of limitations,
or survival of actions.'3 Such procedural matters were not significant
Cf. Brady v. Brady, 161 N.C. 324, 77 S.E. 235 (1913) (trespass on land
in Virginia and removal of trees; though trespass is local action only, plaintiff
may treat the claim as one for conversion or may waive the tort and sue in assumpsit, in which case the action is transitory and may be brought in North
Carolina). See also Richmond Cedar Works v. Roper Lumber Co., 161 N.C.
604, 77 S.E. 770 (1913), where the Court stated: "When the trespasser has sold
the severed property and received money for it, plaintiff's cause, as a cause of
assumpsit for money had and received, is admittedly transitory at common law."
Id. at 607, 77 S.E. at 772.
181 Stroud v. Life Ins. Co., 148 N.C. 54, 61 S.E. 626 (1908)
(action based
upon alleged fraud for an amount in excess of the jurisdictional limits of the
old justice court in tort cases; held, since plaintiff had waived the tort and sued
in assumpsit, the jurisdictional limits were those in contract, not those in tort, and
the claim was within the jurisdiction).
182 Robertson v. Dunn, 87 N.C. 191 (1882). Here T executed a note payable
to A; B converted the note. A's estate sued B's estate, but after the statute of
limitations for conversion had run. "When there has been a tortious taking of
his property, the injured party may bring trespass or trover, or he may waive
both and bring assumpsit for the proceeds, when it shall have been converted
180

into money .

. . ."

Id. at 193. Hence the Court held that money received by B

on the note within the appropriate period was recoverable.
...
Phillips v. Homfray, 23 Ch. D 439 (C.A. 1883), is a leading case. There,
on facts somewhat similar to those in Leigh v. Garysburg Mfg. Co., 132 N.C.
167, 43 S.E. 632 (1903), X had used the plaintiff's real property as a roadway
and carried coal and ironstone across it. X died and the action was revived
against his executrix, who opposed the action on the ground that a personal action
dies with the person, except where something tangible has been removed from
the soil. The Court held that the decedent's estate had not been enriched, except
by saving money otherwise needed to buy a right-of-way, and that the action
would not lie. The Court also held that the plaintiff could not "waive the tort and
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in, say, conversion cases. If defendant in a conversion case were subjected
to the "contract" statute of limitations or the "contract" jurisdiction of
an inferior court, it would hardly disarrange the jurisprudence of the
country. Land cases, however, were different. Venue, at least, and probably about everything else, has been considered of special importance in
land cases, and certainly statutes of limitations or survival of actions
(before modern statutes) were important in land cases. 'If common
law courts had thought of the problem -inland cases as simply a question
of what damages might be recovered against the trespasser, the restitutionary or "assumpsit" damages might have been allowed. But this
was not the way they thought; they thought that if "assumpsit" damages
were allowed, the case was one in assumpsit, and that assumpsit venue,
assumpsit limitations of actions and all the rest went with it. And that was
too much. Apparently in consequence of such a view-now outmoded by
the abolition of the forms of action-courts refused to allow the restitutionary recovery in land cases,' 84 except where something tangible was
taken from the land."8 5 At least they refused to allow "waiver of tort and
suit in assumpsit" in such cases for purposes of changing procedural rules
normally applied to land actions.
There was, seemingly, a second reason why courts were reluctant to
grant a restitutionary recovery for trespass to land. There was an English
statute allowing recovery for the reasonable value of the land when it
was occupied by agreement with the owner but the agreement was not
itself enforceable. This may have implied that a recovery of reasonable
value for the use of land was available only when there had been an
agreement and that such a recovery was not available when the use was
purely tortious. a0 At any rate some commentators thought something
like this. There is a quite similar statute in North Carolina, providing
that when one occupied land by permission under a "parol lease which is
sue in assumpsit" where circumstances negatived the implication of a contract
to pay for the use of the land. Phillips v. Homfray, supra.
"'4One early North Carolina case expressed the view that assumpsit would not
lie for trespass to land. Long v. Bonner, 33 N.C. 27 (1850). But this case apparently is a dead letter today, for two reasons: (1) the Court (per Ruffin, C.J.)
appears to have held only that assumpsit was wrong as a matter of form; it expressly recognized that there was a remedy for inesne profits; and (2) subsequent
decisions, notably Leigh v. Garysburg Mfg. Co., 132 N.C. 167, 43 S.E. 632 (1903),
have allowed a recovery for rental value, which is essentially the same as a recovery in assumpsit as far as damages go.
...
See F. WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI-CONTRACT § 283 (1913). A number of cases in which timber or other goods are removed from the land are discussed at pp. 334-44 supra.
"'8The statute was discussed in Long v. Bonner, 33 N.C. 27 (1850).
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void," the landowner may nevertheless recover the reasonable value for
the use.18 7 But this statute does not seem to preclude recovery of the
reasonable rental value in tort for purely trespassory use; it seems to
be aimed at a narrow situation only and does not seem to exclude a
similar recovery in tort. At any rate, such a recovery of rental value
has been allowed in North Carolina for purely tortious use of land, so
that such a statute does not appear to affect the issue today, whatever
was the case in England.'3 8
Finally, courts may have been reluctant to allow restitutionary recoveries in cases where the "use" of land was so minimal that it furnished
no workable measure of damages. If defendant takes a single short cut
across plaintiff's lawn, he has not in any workable sense "used" the land
and the gain to him is not an appropriate measure of recovery. If the
defendant daily parks his car on the plaintiff's property to save himself
the expense of parking in a commercial lot, however, the matter is different, and the landowner should recover the expense saved to the defendant
by this deliberate trespass, and this is so even if the plaintiff is not
"ousted.' 8 9
None of these reasons seems to have any weight today in cases where
defendant makes some substantial use of the land. The statute allowing
recovery of rental value where there is agreement had not precluded rental
value recovery where there was no agreement. And the common law
fiction that rental value was a suit on contract and the resulting assumption that all procedures for contracts must be followed if the tort were
"waived," are of no effect since the forms of action have been abolished.
Today it is plain enough that the issue is damages-and that to allow
restitutionary damages does not require a contract venue. Presumably
the common law reluctance to allow "assumpsit" for use and occupation
should have little influence in preventing recovery of appropriate damages.
This view is bolstered by the fact that mesne profits were always recoverable following an ejectment suit, even in the days when forms of action
rode roughshod, so that it is apparent that there is no substantial objection
to the damages as such. Finally, it may be noticed that North Carolina
long ago indicated an absence of sympathy with the common law attitude
and has allowed recovery of rental value of land occupied by tortfeasors.
"7N.C. GEN. STAT. § 42-4 (1966). Reasonable value for the use of land is
also authorized in the special situation where the trespasser claims under the
Betterments Act, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-340 to-351 (1953).
'Leigh v. Garysburg Mfg. Co., 132 N.C. 167, 43 S.E. 632 (1903).
''Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 43 N.J. 508, 205 A.2d 744 (1964).
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This being done, there seems no reason, when an appropriate case arises,
not to allow recovery of profits gained by the deliberate bad faith trespasser as well, at least where such profits are fairly attributable to use
of the land, rather than to labor or capital investment.
Measurement of the gain or benefit to defendant

In some cases the benefit or gain to the defendant resulting from his
tort is clear. For example, he may use land with a rental value of 1,000
dollars for its best and most productive use, in which case he clearly has
received a value of 1,000 dollars in his use of the land. Likewise, if he
saves an expense of 1,000 dollars, he has benefited to that extent.
In some cases, however, the defendant may not use the land in the
most productive way, and in a sense does not get its full value. Since
the plaintiff's recovery in the cases under discussion is the "benefit" to
the defendant rather than the loss to the plaintiff, it might seem appropriate to measure the defendant's net benefit, that is, the advantage he
actually gained, and to allow the plaintiff to recover that. This seems a
fair recovery when it is remembered that if the plaintiff's losses exceed
such an amount, the plaintiff will base his claim on the losses rather than
on the defendant's gains. However, it seems clear, at least where the
defendant-trespasser acts deliberately and in bad faith, that he is liable,
not merely for the benefit he actually derived but rather for the reasonable
rental value of the land-"the actual rental value of the land, and not
what the defendant actually gathered from the land. ' "'9 This measure
seems unwarranted and uselessly punitive when the trespasser is not
willful and where it seems unlikely that the plaintiff would have been
able to rent the premises and thus has no actual losses. 19 '
In any event the rule that the plaintiff recovers the "actual rental
value of the land, and not what the defendant actually gathered" is a
The Court added lan..
0 Credle v. Ayers, 126 N.C. 11, 35 S.E. 128 (1900).
guage suggesting that the plaintiff may have really lost such an amount-"The
object is to put the plaintiff.., in statu quo, by giving as compensation the rental
value that could have been had ... ." Id at 13, 35 S.E. at 129. But there is no
proof indicating that the plaintiffs could in fact have rented the land out and
such proof is never in fact required.

101A similar method of measuring benefit is used in cases where the defendant
makes an oral promise unenforceable under the statute of frauds, and plaintiff
is allowed a quasi-contract recovery. In many such cases, the plaintiff gets the
market value of the services rendered or goods leased whether the defendant used
them or not. E.g., Clinkinbeard v. Poole, 266 S.W.2d 796 (Ky. Ct. App. 1954);
Bennett Leasing Co. v. Ellison, 15 Utah 2d 72, 387 P.2d 246 (1963). But such
cases furnish no very suitable analogy in the trespass cases, absent a deliberate
trespass, for in the statute of frauds cases the defendant has bargained for what
he got, even if his bargain is not enforceable.
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minimum, not a maximum. If the defendant actually gathers rents, those
rents may be recovered by the plaintiff.19 2 And there may be cases in
which there is no rental value for the peculiar use to which defendant
puts the land. In such cases, recovery should be measured by the benefit
unless an inverse condemto the defendant,"9 3 in savings or otherwise,
19 4
used.
is
"taking"
the
nation proceeding for
Defendant's gain as substantive ground for recovery
In the preceding materials, discussion turned on whether the landowner might recover from the trespasser on the basis of the benefit accruing to the trespasser from his tort, rather than on the basis of loss to the
landowner. A further possibility is worth attention: may benefit accruing
to a defendant, perhaps only indirectly from a trespass, justify recovery
when no recovery at all would otherwise be allowed? Are there cases
in which benefit to the defendant is not merely a measure of damages,
but furnishes the basis of liability in the first place?
Perhaps this possibility was overlooked in Williams v. Cape Fear
Lumber Co.' 95 The plaintiff there owned the fee and conveyed a limited
timber right to defendant. Defendant did not himself enter the land,
but instead conveyed the timber rights he owned to T, who entered and
cut timber, but cut in excess of that granted. The question was whether
the defendant-who had not entered on the land-was liable. Since
defendant had not gone on the land physically, he was not a trespasser.
On the other hand, the defendant was paid by T by the board foot. Thus,
defendant must have been paid not only for the timber that could
be rightfully cut, but also for the timber T wrongfully cut. At least the
defendant had a right to such payment under his contract with T. Thus,
though it was T who trespassed, the benefit of the trespass went to defendant and the loss to the landowner-plaintiff. It seems clear that if
this is so, the plaintiff should be allowed to recover against defendant,
on grounds partly analogous to those used in "tracing" in the law of
constructive trusts. The point was not, however, raised.
In a similar case, London v. Bear,"" recovery was allowed. There
one Hall went into possession of lands of the plaintiff and leased them.
He then assigned the rent from some of the premises to the defendant.
" 2 Womack v. Carter, 160 N.C. 286, 75 S.E. 1102 (1912); London v. Bear,
84 N.C. 266 (1881).
"'See Note, 48 HARv. L. REv. 485 (1935).
"' See pp. 344-51 supra.
172 N.C. 299, 90 S.E. 254 (1916).
1'84 N.C. 266 (1881).
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Partly because of "his acceptance of full rent," the defendant was held
liable, and presumably this result would obtain even if defendant never
entered the premises at all.
The conclusion seems to be that one benefiting from a trespass may,
in proper cases, be required to disgorge the benefit to the landowner,
even though he is not himself physically a trespasser.
Defendant's gain as limit of liability
Ordinarily, if the plaintiff can recover the gain to the defendant at
all (rather than his own losses) it is entirely optional; he selects the
measure of damages that will afford him the greatest recovery.
As already indicated, however, there are some cases in which the
gain to the defendant should not be allowed as an alternative measure
of recovery and in which the plaintiff should be allowed to recover his
There may well be cases in which the converse
losses and no more.'
is also true-in which the plaintiff should be allowed to recover on the
basis of the defendant's gain, but on no other basis.
Where there has been no tangible loss-where there is neither physical
detriment to the land nor loss in a pecuniary sense-the plaintiff still
has a right to exclusive possession and may recover at least nominal
damages to vindicate that right, and sometimes punitive damages as
well. The value of the right to be left alone on one's own land is not
capable of objective measurement and juries may be permitted considerable leeway in granting damages, even when punitive damages as such
are not justified. However, where the trespass is minor and innocent,
and where neither physical harm to the land nor economic harm to the
plaintiff results, an award of substantial damages would be hard to
justify unless on the ground that such damages represented gain to the
defendant.
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Scully 9 8 is illustrative. Defendant, an oil
company, trespassed on plaintiff's land in exploratory work in which
dynamite was exploded and vibrations recorded to indicate the presence
or absence of minerals. The dynamiting did not damage the land, which
was marsh without value except for trapping purposes and oil exploration.
On the contrary, the plaintiff clearly had no loss at all, since the trespass revealed the presence of valuable minerals and since the oil company advised
the landowner of this fact, so that he would have opportunities for leasing
the land to oil drillers. The jury awarded the plaintiff one dollar an acre
...
See note 178 supra & accompanying text.
10871 F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1934).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

for his total holdings, a sum of 26,795 dollars, but the appellate court
reversed, indicating that the value to the defendant was the appropriate

measure of damages, rather than loss to the plaintiff, in these circumstances. "In attempting to apply a measure of damages sounding in loss,
the court was thus driven to submitting this impossible, and under the
evidence, meaningless measure of damage."' Had the dynamiting physically damaged the land, of course, the plaintiff would have had losses;
and had the dynamiting revealed not the presence but the absence of
mineral deposits, the plaintiff would have had losses; for he would at
least have lost the lease-for-speculation value of his land. But absent any
losses, and absent a bad faith trespass or even any serious dignitary
invasion, it seems clearly right to limit substantial damage to the gain
to the defendant.
Summary
(1) Where tangible items are removed from the land, the owner
may recover their value, or the diminution of land value whichever is
appropriate to the case.200
(2) Where defendant uses the land and does not remove any item,
the plaintiff has the option of recovering for any damage done, or nominal
damages, plus punitive damages if they are warranted ;201 the plaintiff
may, however, recover any actual gain to the defendant, such as rents
he takes from the plaintiff's tenants, or may recover rental value even
if the plaintiff would not have leased the premises and thus has no actual
losses.2 02

(3) In appropriate cases it seems probable that the plaintiff may
recover, at his option and in lieu of any of the above items, the profits
made by the defendant from use of the land; this is probably to be permitted only when the defendant is an intentional wrongdoer,2 0 3 and where
he is not, the plaintiff is probably limited to rental value of the land.20 4
(4) The trespasser's benefit or gain-to be recovered by the plaintiff
-may be measured either by the actual benefit received by the defendant
(including savings to him),205 or by the reasonable value of the land,
disregarding the fact that defendant may not have taken full advantage
199
0 Id. at 775.
See pp. 334-44
201
Id.
2

supra.

"' Womack v. Carter, 160 N.C. 286, 75 S.E. 1102 (1912); London v. Bear,

84 N.C. 266 (1881).
...
Edwards v. Lee's Adm'r, 265 Ky. 418, 96 S.W.2d 1028 (1936).
...
Leigh v. Garysburg Mfg. Co., 132 N.C. 167, 43 S.E. 632 (1903).
...
A good discussion of this is found in a conversion of chattels case, Olwell
v. Nye & Nissen Co., 26 Wash. 2d 282, 173 P.2d 652 (1946).
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of it.2"" Which measure of benefit is used depends upon the plaintiff's
option, and probably upon whether the defendant is a deliberate wrongdoer.
(5) In addition to recoveries for trespass, in which benefit to defendant
is an alternative measure of damages, some persons may be held for the
amount of benefit received from a trespass even" though they did not
themselves enter the land. 0 7
DAMAGES-AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES
Contributory negligence is no defense to an intentional tort, and

thus is ordinarily no defense to trespass to land.20 8 If the landowner or
occupier takes affirmative action that increases damages to his land,
however, he may be denied recovery for such damages as he himself has
or intended to increase the
caused, at least if his acts are unreasonable
20 9
damages caused by the trespass.

Beyond this, a landowner may in some cases be required to take
action, even to expend money, to minimize the damages caused by the
trespass. "The general principle is fully recognized with us that, in case
of contract broken or tort committed, the injured party should do what
reasonable care and business prudence requires to minimize the loss."2'0
What acts one must take to minimize his losses will, of course, vary with
circumstances. He is not required to incur substantial expense to protect
his property, at least where the protection would be experimental and
where it might result in liability to others. 21 ' Nor is he required to go
upon defendant's land and repair the fence to prevent defendant's cattle
from escaping, since "[tjhis would have been protecting the defendants'
land at the plaintiff's expense

,,,212

and ordinarily this would not be a

reasonable requirement. On the same principle, the landowner need not
.06
Credle v. Ayers, 126 N.C. 11, 35 S.E. 128 (1900).
207

See London v. Bear, 84 N.C. 266 (1881).

Where liability for entrance upon land is based upon negligence rather
than upon intent, however, contributory negligence is presumably a bar. As to
negligence liability, see Schloss v. Hallman, 255 N.C. 686, 122 S.E.2d 513 (1961);
Smith v. Pate, 246 N.C. 63, 97 S.E.2d 457 (1957).
Defendant's evidence was that
0 Henley v. Wilson, 81 N.C. 405 (1879).
208

plaintiff had dammed sluices on his land, contributing to the total damage.
Presumably if the landowner's acts are reasonable, even though they result
in additional damage, the trespasser will not be relieved of liability for the addi-

tional damages, just as one is not relieved in negligence cases when the plaintiff

makes an emergency response that increases his injury.
"'0Yowmans v. City of Hendersonville, 175 N.C. 574, 579, 96 S.E. 45, 47

(1918).

Id.
Dixon v. District Grand Lodge of Odd Fellows, 174 N.C. 139, 141, 93 S.E.
461, 462 (1917).
212
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invest additional capital in a business damaged by a trespasser in order
to minimize the trespasser's damage. 213
In some cases the Court has said that a landowner, flooded by defendant's wrongful act, is not required to reduce his damages by cutting
drainage ditches, because the landowner "is not required to incur such
expense."2 14 One of these cases indicates that the plaintiff need not act
to avoid losses or minimize his damage in cases of tort, but only in cases
of contract.2 15 This is plainly wrong, however, and the Court clearly
recognizes the duty to take reasonable care to minimize damages in tort
cases.2 6 The real explanation for not requiring the landowner to ditch
his own land seems to be that, under the circumstances at least, it would
be an unreasonable burden upon him.
In Waters v. Kear,1 1 the defendant diverted waters onto the plaintiff's
land. At the trial there was evidence to the effect that he offered to ditch
plaintiff's land to drain the waters. The Court held that this evidence
was irrelevant and that a verdict should be entered for the plaintiff, because "the defendant had no legal right to require this, and the plaintiff
was not required to assent to the defendant cutting a ditch through her
land.
,*"21"Though it is not clear, the diversion of waters was apparently intentional rather than accidental. Where that is the case, and where
a ditch would be permanently required to drain the lands, the Court's
ruling is surely correct, for any other ruling would allow the defendant
a kind of private eminent domain, under which he could use the plaintiff's
land so long as he did the physical labor. This apparently is what the
Court had in mind, for it suggested condemnation under the Drainage
Act.21 Where the trespass is accidental and not permanent, and where
ditches could be temporary, very probably a different result could be
justified.
Johnston v. Rudesill, 46 N.C. 510 (1854) (sawmill).
Borden v. Carolina Power & Light Co., 174 N.C. 72, 75, 93 S.E. 442, 443
(1917); See Cardwell v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 171 N.C. 365, 88 S.E. 495 (1916).
In Barcliff v. Norfolk & S.R.R., 168 N.C. 268, 84 S.E. 290 (1915), the Court
21

214

stated flatly that he "is not required to avoid damages to his land . . . by digging
ditches .... ." Id. at 270, 84 S.E. at 292. See also Waters v. Kear, 168 N.C.
246, 84 S.E. 292 (1915), where the Court also said that the landowner was not
even required to allow defendant to cut drainage ditches on plaintiff's land.
21 Cardwell v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 171 N.C. 365, 88 S.E. 495 (1916).
21
Yowmans v. City of Hendersonville, 175 N.C. 574, 96 S.E. 45 (1918).
21? 168 N.C. 246, 84 S.E. 292 (1915).
Id. at 247, 84 S.E. at 292.
219 See N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 156-1 to -25 (1964).
A similar point was suggested
in Roberts v. Baldwin, 155 N.C. 276, 71 S.E. 319 (1911), where on similar facts
the Court held that the plaintiff was not required to drain the land to minimize
his losses, since to hold otherwise would make it "unnecessary for the upper proprietor to institute legal proceedings to drain through the lands of the lower
proprietor." Id. at 282, 71 S.E. at 322.

